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ABSTRACT
Workers Health in Connecticut:
An Historical Analysis of the Uretek Outbreak
David B Cowan
1988
In the fall of 1986, the largest reported contemporary
outbreak of occupationally induced liver injury in the
United States was reported at a New Haven factory called
Uretek.
The plant produced polyurethane coated textiles
used in rafts and inflatable aircraft slides with common
chemicals employed in thousands of other plants worldwide.
A clinical and epidemiological study of the plant revealed
that 36 of 58 (62%) workers tested had elevations of either
aspartate aminotransferase (AST or SGOT) or alanine
aminotransferase (ALT or SGPT).
Only 1 of 12 nonproduction
workers showed any elevations (p < .01).
Common infectious
causes of hepatitis were excluded serologically in all but
two workers, and toxic liver injury was confirmed histologi¬
cally in five biopsied workers.
The occurrence contradicted
the prevailing medical opinion that toxic hepatitis was an
entity of the past.
The workplace survey identified
Dimethylformamide (DMF), a widely used solvent and known
hepatotoxin, as the most likely cause of disease.
Case
Reports published since the Uretek outbreak suggest that DMF
may be a health concern for other workers and the public.
The outbreak was greeted with horror and astonishment
by the press and government officials.
However, the
investigation that followed revealed that state and federal
government bureaucracies had known about some hazards at
Uretek for almost a decade.
More important, the original
furor over who was to blame for conditions at Uretek
obscured a startling fact: no contemporary institution had
the authority and expertise to evaluate and correct
workplace health hazards like those uncovered at Uretek.
Contrary to popular belief, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) has never been able to
accomplish this task.
The focus of the news reports also
ignored important history: that the Connecticut Department
of Health had performed just such a role as a workplace
health watchdog in the 1920's until the 1950's.
The assumption that the outbreak represented an unad¬
dressed gap in a seamless program was inaccurate and short¬
sighted.
Uretek exposed the flaws of the current system in
a uniquely lucid fashion.
This paper attempts to glean from
the Uretek example, and from the history of occupational
health in the state, better means of protecting workers from
occupational disease in the future.
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CHAPTER ONE:

In the fall of 1986,

INTRODUCTION

the largest reported contemporary

outbreak of occupationally induced liver disease in the
United States was discovered at a New Haven factory.

The

plant produced polyurethane coated textiles used in life
rafts and inflatable aircraft escape slides,
things.

among other

The coating mixture included chemicals employed in

thousands of other plants worldwide.
story of successful
and of workers,

factory owners,

It was a gripping
irresponsible at best,

physically and economically vulnerable,

the press lost little time trumpeting the drama.
point of view of journalists,

and

From the

the outbreak of liver disease,

coupled with a major building collapse in Bridgeport,
occupational health on the front page.

placed

From the point of

view of the academic physicians and professionals

involved,

it was a textbook case of disease identification and
prevention which resulted in a successful medical

interven¬

tion,

and a

full recovery of most affected individuals,

credible surveillance program to guard against recurrence.
Finally,

for government regulators,

chemical was

identified along with laws that didn't help,

surveillance that didn't work,
timorous.

a potentially hazardous

and enforcement that was

No one doubted that the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration

(OSHA)

represented a major improvement

.
■
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Introduction
over the unregulated past which had preceded it.

There

seemed to be general agreement that whatever problems
existed were reflections of underfunding and understaffing.
However,

there was also a story that was not told and

assumptions that were not questioned.

Absent in the din of

press accounts was an awareness of the vigorous occupational
health surveillance system that existed in Connecticut in
the 1940's and

'50's.

In the rush to assign culpability,

and avoid responsibility,

there was no awareness of the fact

that the outbreak probably couldn't have happened 40 years
ago.

The hubris of the "progress mentality"

miss what the workers understood:

caused many to

there was something

terribly wrong with the system far beyond the funding of
Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

This thesis

is an attempt to discover what lessons the outbreak,
history of workplace surveillance,
medicine.

and the

hold for occupational

The next chapter presents the findings of a

clinical-epidemiological survey of the Uretek workers,

the

first contemporary cross-sectional epidemiologic study to
link hepatitis to an organic solvent.1

Chapter three

consists of a discussion of the chemicals used at Uretek,
especially DMF and its known hazards.

Chapter four includes

a brief discussion of the strike and the response of
government to the crisis,

while the history of occupational

health in Connecticut is the topic of the fifth chapter.

.
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The sixth and final chapter will present recommendations

for

the future.

The Outbreak

Medically,

the hepatitis outbreak was of interest

because of the high attack rate—36 of 58
tested;

(62%)

workers

because of the severity and chronicity of several of

the cases;

and simply because it occurred at all.

The

rarity of acute liver disease as a consequence of workplace
exposure is widely accepted.
hepatotoxicity,

The foremost authority on

US pathologist Hyman Zimmerman,

1978 that "occupational exposure has,
subacute and acute chemical,

concluded in

in the past,

hepatic injury.

led to

[However],

this overt form of occupational hepatic disease has largely
disappeared

[italics mine]."2

Thus,

the discovery of the

outbreak was not only a contradiction of the prevailing
diagnostic opinion,
detection,

but an opportunity to explore the

treatment,

rare disease.

and natural history of a supposedly

An epidemiologic study was undertaken by the

staff of the occupational medicine program of Yale medical
school and Yale-New Haven Hospital.3

The occupational

nature of the outbreak was confirmed by ruling out other
causes of hepatitis in the workforce and Dimethyl Formamide
(DMF)

was

identified as the most likely cause,

by reviewing

biological testing data and conditions in the plant.

DMF

■

■
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(HCON (CH3)2)

9

is an excellent and versatile solvent widely

used in the production of synthetic fibers, polyurethane,
pharmaceuticals, herbicides,

and numerous other compounds.

Appropriate changes were made, under the direction of the
occupational medicine program,

to ensure that the workers

safety was protected and that a medical monitoring system
was established.

Social & Political Consequences
The Uretek outbreak,
occurred,

named for the factory where it

is worthy of careful analysis for more than the

unique medical information it imparts.
event with social consequences,

It was a medical

reflected in the fact that

the outbreak was the nidus for a great deal of activity
apart from the epidemiological study.
political,

Uretek was a social,

and economic drama as well. The workers were poor

immigrants from Puerto Rico,
were here illegally,

El Salvador,

and Chile.

Some

and possessed a paradoxical fear that

recognition of the outbreak might lead to their deportation.
The workers became the focus of a bitter unionization drive
during the investigation of the outbreak,

a drive based

primarily on health and safety concerns.

Meanwhile,

the

workers, who in the best of times were compensated near the
minimum wage,

experienced a type of wage intimidation all

too common in the workplace:

company attorneys tied the

.
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workers'

compensation cases up in court.

The owners had

other legal troubles having been the first company convicted
of violating Connecticut's new Hazardous Waste Disposal Act.
The grounds of Uretek,
casionally played,

where neighborhood children oc¬

were strewn with hundreds of unmarked

and leaking barrels filled with waste solvents.

The

factory

had been pumping hundreds of tons of solvent fumes into the
air of a residential neighborhood for years,
new revelations about the factory,

and with the

neighbors were angry.

Everyone from doctors to neighbors,

from workers to local

politicians called for "the government" to do something,
though this

"something" was vitiated by competing interests.

Shutdown was,

for example,

the neighbors choice,

workers wanted jobs with diminished risk.
the allure of life-threatening disease,
desperate immigrants,

national media,

This story,

with

competing interests,

and bureaucratic inertia took the top

spot on local television for days,
newspaper material

whereas the

for weeks.

and was front page

Eventually it reached the

print and electronic.

The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administra¬
tion

(OSHA),

department of health,

department of labor,

state environmental protection agency became involved.

and
All

of these agencies expressed shock and indignation at the
first reports,

but in the ensuing discussions,

the hepatitis

outbreak somehow fell outside of each one's purview.
workers were understandably puzzled,

The

the attorney general

.

11

Introduction
was

frustrated in his attempts to determine who had

authority over the health of the workers,
was busy pointing fingers.

and everyone else

"How could Uretek happen in

1987?" asked the attorney general of Connecticut.
With surprising clarity,

the outbreak revealed a number

of important facts about the condition of occupational
health in Connecticut,

and by implication,

the U.S.

It

pointed to a profound misunderstanding of health and safety
laws:

misunderstanding by the public,

officials,

and elected

of the capabilities of the agencies and miscon¬

ception by the agencies of their own responsibilities.
duration of poor conditions at Uretek,

The

at least a decade,

suggested that there might be large numbers of similar
"outbreaks" unrecognized and unreported nationwide.
fact,

In

the poor conditions at Uretek persisted for so long

that one wonders if they would ever have been corrected had
it not been for a series of happenstances.

The fact that as

many as 32 of 36 workers with liver abnormalities were
asymptomatic,

far from confirming the rarity of occupational

liver toxicity,
detected cases.

pointed to the possibility of many un¬
The Attorney General's question seemed

worthy of further study.
The press concluded that Reagan era budget cuts had
allowed Uretek to exist and persist.
inspected the plant in 1979,

OSHA had after all

but not since.

analysis Uretek heightens concerns,

But on deeper

voiced for years,

about
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the adequacy of the Occupational Safety and Health
and the state laws which regulate the workplace.
failure of the "system"

(OSH)

act

The

in the Uretek case elucidates that

what has become widely accepted as the answer to workplace
injuries and illnesses
OSH act of 1970,

(by management and some unions),

the

is really ill-equipped to deal with disease

even in the best of circumstances.

The flaw,

in a word,

is

that neither physicians nor other health professionals are
involved in workplace evaluation.
A look at the uncharted history of occupational health
in Connecticut reveals that workers

in 1947 may have been

better protected than workers in 1987.

For example,

physicians played a central and active role in workplace
health protection through the state Bureau of Industrial
Hygiene.

Sadly current proposals for improving the health

of workers,

such as the establishment of a reliable

reporting system,

or a system of medical monitoring,

debated in the Connecticut legislature in 1927.

were

Even the

arguments advanced in the debate have changed little.
Blaming the victim is as popular in 1987 as

it was

in 1927,

though owners and legislators are less likely to state this
view openly.

In 1927,

a congressman asserted that "98% of

the accidents are due to the carelessness of the operator."4
Sixty years later,

Uretek attorneys maintained the position

that worker illness was due to carelessness,
"moral turpitude".

self-abuse,

The poverty of this view is also

and

.
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unchanged with time and will be evident after a review of
the outbreak.

Chapter five as already mentioned,

examines

the history of occupational health legislation in Connec¬
ticut,

and in the nation to the extent necessary to make

sense of events in the state.
There is at present a restricted but vigorous debate
occurring about the means to improve workplace health and
safety.

Chapter six.

Prognoses and Prescriptions,

contribution to this dialogue.

is a

It reexamines the lessons of

the outbreak with an eye to detecting and preventing
workplace illness in the future.
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Endnotes

1.

D0ssing

(1986),

132.

2.

Zimmerman (1978), 315.
See also Mitchell, J.W.
al. (1987), 266 which appears in chapter 2.

3.

Due to difficulty obtaining the cooperation of
the factory owners, the study began after the
institution of environmental controls made on the
program's recommendation.

4.

Public Health and Safety Committee Hearing

et

(1927).
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CHAPTER TWO:

The Uretek outbreak,

THE OUTBREAK

its size and severity,

raises

serious questions about the veracity of conclusions reached
by Dr Zimmerman,

and others,

occupational liver disease.

concerning the rarity of
A statement issued by the

American Occupational Medicine Association's Committee on
occupational medical practice,

"representing the composite

best judgement of its members",

demonstrates just how widely

this view of hepatotoxins is held.
Many of the solvents used in the early days of the
chemical industry were hepatorenal toxins of some
note, eg Carbon Tetrachloride.
However, as this
problem was recognized, solvents intended for
routine use were selected so that hepatotoxicity
is not a prominent feature.1
Although this thesis argues that the prevailing opinion is
ill-founded,

it is important to keep it in mind when

assessing the skill and acumen of the medical professionals
presented with the outbreak.

Investigators had to overcome

their intimate acquaintance with an authoritative view which
denied the disease they were observing.
An index case is in some ways as revelatory about
medical reasoning as it is about pathology.
patient's story is quite informative,

As the first

particularly in regard

to how such outbreaks can be discovered-or missed- it is
presented in some detail.

The rest of the cases will be
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presented in aggregate and the medical and epidemiological
findings summarized.
Roberto Betancourt2,

a robust 40 year old Puerto Rican,

arrived in New Haven just four months before his hospital
visit.

He spoke little English and had left his immediate

family behind.
better life,
factory,

He had come to New Haven with hopes of a

and his brother-in-law,

a worker at a local

had found him a job with his employer two weeks

before his trip to the hospital.
September of 1986 Mr.

On the last Sunday in

Betancourt had his niece take him to

the Yale-New Haven hospital emergency room because of
abdominal pain,
days before.
assistant,

headache and nausea that had begun a few

He was seen by Heidi Miller,

and Dr.

Steven Sigal,

Actually it was not Mr.
symptoms;

a Physician's

a resident in medicine.

Betancourt's first visit with these

he had been sent home from the ER two days before

with the diagnosis of flu,

and a day later,

gastritis.

Nor

was he the first Hispanic man to present with a similar
story,

nor even the first Uretek worker referred to the

occupational medicine clinic,
was.3

However,

weeks later.
headache,

as Mr Betancourt eventually

these facts were not appreciated until many

The medical history was non-specific;

nausea,

and variable midepigastric abdominal pain

which was not exacerbated or alleviated by food,
symptoms worsened after one beer.
previous

Mr.

though his

Betancourt denied

illnesses and alcohol or drug abuse,

stating that

17
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he drank five to ten beers per week.
workers,

there was no special

vocational etiology.

As

in the case of most

sign or symptom indicating

In fact,

it might never have come to

light if not for the fact that both providers

in the ER had

an interest in and knowledge about work-related disease.
Prompted by their unusual

interest,

him closely about his work.

the examiners questioned

The job his brother had

obtained for him two weeks before was
Lenox St in New Haven,

in a

"glue"

factory on

the name of which he did not know.

He worked with chemicals which smelled bad but there had not
been any accidents to his knowledge.

He had heard rumors of

other workers who had been ill but could not provide
details.

This line of questioning was not pursued any

further at the time as the two providers had already
obtained a good occupational history for a case that did not
seem likely to be work-related.
work,

it seemed far more likely that this was something he

had brought with him from home:
hepatitis,
drinking,
ulcer,

After just two weeks at

viral,

or perhaps alcoholic

the latter as a consequence of excessive
despite his denial of abuse.

cholecystitis,

and cholelithiasis

Finally,

a gastric

(the latter two

diseases representing disease of the gall bladder),
out the likely possibilities.
unremarkable,

rounded

The physical exam was

including heme negative stool,

and clinicians

felt that the diagnosis of an ulcer was unlikely.
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A battery of appropriate tests was ordered,
CBC with differential cell counts,
function tests, hepatitis A (IgM)
surface antibody and antigen,
parasites.

electrolytes,

including a
liver

antibody, hepatitis B

and stool for ova and

Concluding that Mr.

Betancourt's workplace

sounded worrisome even if it was not the cause of his
symptoms, Ms Miller arranged for him to be seen the
following Friday at the Occupational Medicine Clinic.
The occupational clinic is located in the old hospital
building adjacent to the new medical center.
in 1979 by Dr Mark Cullen,

It was founded

a graduate of both the Yale

medical school and the internal medicine residency program,
with the goal of filling a need for workplace health and
safety services in the heavily industrialized region around
the medical center,

as well as to provide training to future

occupational health specialists.

Dr.

Cullen perceived that

the passage of the Occupational Health and Safety Act
of 1970,

(OSHA)

far from resolving the issues of workplace health,

had only increased the need for physicians knowledgeable
about the treatment and prevention of occupational diseases,
particularly since all but the largest area employers did
not have their own health experts4.

The clinic operates

quite independently of the rest of the medical center as Dr.
Cullen's success at funding the clinic with outside grants
has brought with it a good deal of autonomy.
Uretek outbreak,

Until the

in fact, many people within the medical

.
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center were unaware of its existence.
that the clinic was not busy.

That is not to say

It has always enjoyed a good

reputation among area unions, health and safety groups,
the few area physicians aware of it,

and as a result,

there

have always been more patients than staff to see them.
the time of Mr.

and

At

Betancourt's visit to the emergency room in

the fall of 1986 there was a three to four week wait for
appointments despite the fact that the clinical staff had
doubled in the previous two years to include three physi¬
cians, three fellows5,

an industrial hygienist,

social worker and consulting psychiatrist,
logist,

and a part-time data coordinator,

a part-time

an epidemio¬
in addition to

social work and medical students on rotation.
My first day in clinic as a medical student happened to
be the day of Mr Betancourt's appointment, October 3,
Dr Cullen and Dr Redlich,

a first year fellow ,

heard of the patient from Heidi Miller.

1986.

had already

There was skep¬

ticism that his symptoms could be work-related given the
rarity of toxic hepatitis and the short period of exposure.
Nonetheless,
more so.

the story was intriguing...and quickly became

By the time Mr Betancourt was seen in clinic he

was feeling somewhat better.

Ms Miller had instructed him

to stay away from work which had turned out to be no
problem: his employer had fired him when he called in sick.
A number of laboratory results had come back:
third ER visit

(9/28)

the day of his

the Aspartate Aminotransferase

(AST or

'
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SGOT)

20

had been 949 U/L (nl 15-35)

including Alkaline Phosphatase,
all normal.

while other tests

Bilirubin,

and Lipase were

Hepatitis A IgM antibody was negative as was

Hepatitis B Surface Antigen.

Hepatitis A IgG was positive

indicating a distant history of Hepatitis A infection but
this was unsurprising in a Puerto Rican native and did not
account for the current signs or symptoms.
Function Tests

(LFT's), drawn the day prior to the occupa¬

tional clinic visit,

showed the AST greatly improved at 31,

but the Alanine Aminotransferase
the first time,

Repeat Liver

(ALT or SGPT),

at 317 U/L (nl 6-37).

assayed for

The patient was again

asked about alcohol and drug consumption and he adamantly
maintained his earlier report of no more than 10 beers per
week.

It was decided that an ultrasonographic examination

of the gall bladder was indicated; a few days later it was
reported as normal.

The patients symptoms and transaminases

were improving slowly and he promised to bring in the name
of the factory on a follow-up visit
few days.

(he had no phone)

in a

After screens for Cytomegalovirus and Epstein-

Barr virus were negative, the presumptive diagnosis of toxic
hepatitis was reached, by exclusion, with the thought that
perhaps the patient was peculiarly sensitive to the
chemicals in the plant.

Everyone wanted to find out more

about the employer, but there was no outward harbinger that
this was an index case.

Outbreak
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In another stroke of good fortune, Heidi Miller again
happened to be in the ER a few days later when another
Hispanic gentleman arrived with the same symptoms,

and

importantly the same place of employment on Lenox St.
company was called Uretek,

The

and there he and 40 others coated

fabric with "glue" for parachutes and life rafts he said.
The second patient was also evaluated in the Occupational
medicine clinic with the same results:
abdominal pain,
and no job,
ill.

no alcohol abuse,

elevated LFT's and

no infectious diseases,

as he too had been fired when he reported he was

The clinic social worker was called in to help both

workers apply for worker's compensation.

Although it

appeared that they had been fired illegally,

legal activity

was postponed? no one was eager to go back to Uretek.
Dr. William Beckett,

a faculty member in the clinic,

took on the chore of contacting the employer.

This can be a

frustrating endeavor as the Yale clinic operates without
any legal authority and can only enter workplaces with
permission.

Although a physician or anyone else is free to

contact the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Ad¬
ministration

(OSHA),

the clinic had been frustrated by the

results of recent attempts.

Since Reagan had taken office,

OSHA had taken to inspecting only on the complaint of a
worker.

Betancourt and his colleague had been conveniently

terminated.

While logic would dictate that an inspection

might be prudent,

recent experience raised doubts about the

22
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prospect of a vigorous inspection.

OSHA had been known in

recent years to call an employer in lieu of inspecting if
the complaint had not come from a worker.

A few months

before, OSHA had declined to inspect a dry cleaning business
from which clinic staff had examined several overexposed
workers

(and which refused to cooperate with the clinic)

grounds the complaint was "too vague".

on

The clinic in¬

dustrial hygienist customarily received long questionnaires
in response to reports to OSHA.

As she said,

"if I knew the

answers to all of their questions, we wouldn't have filed an
OSHA complaint to begin with."6
Even if an inspection had been performed there were
additional reasons to doubt its quality and timeliness.
OSHA, badly underfunded during the Reagan years,
backlog of inspection requests.
inspectors

had a long

Morale among the remaining

(only two remained in Connecticut)

was low.

It

was understood that no one would be promoted if they were
viewed as a zealot.

Much more important, however,

lack of funding was lack of expertise.

than the

Even pre-Reagan OSHA

lacked the personnel to deal with a health problem such as
toxic hepatitis, with no physicians involved at the
inspection level.

There was also always the chance that the

offending substances might not be on OSHA's list of
regulated hazards; only 500 have been recognized to date of
the more than 50,000 substances in widespread use.

On top

of it all, procedural snarls could delay abatement of

■
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enforceable hazards for months or even years.
prospects of a bungled investigation,
approval on existing conditions,
called for swift action,

With the

or worse a stamp of

and a health problem that

it seemed wiser to delay contacting

OSHA if by doing so the clinic could identify the process
responsible for hepatotoxicity.

To do otherwise was to risk

sentencing the remaining Uretek workers to continued
morbidity or mortality.

There was eventually a debate among

the staff about notifying OSHA and the press when the needs
of the fired workers conflicted with those that still worked
at the plant.

For the moment,

however,

the public's right

to know was viewed as secondary to the clinic's respon¬
sibility to the workers.
It was unclear if Dr Beckett would be successful.
First he was told that he would have to speak to Mr Andrews,
then a week later that Mr Andrews would be "away in Europe
for a few months".

Dr Beckett explained that we were

concerned about a potential hazard at the plant that
couldn't wait a few months:

two workers had toxic hepatitis,

an illness that could be fatal

if exposure continued.

We

would need to know what chemicals were in use and would like
to see the production process.

He reminded them that the

Yale program did not issue fines or charge a fee but would
simply make recommendations.
works with most employers.

Fortunately,

this approach

Uretek however was unmoved;

they

would have to check with their attorney as the formulae were

.
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"proprietary".

In the face of two seriously ill patients

and the companies uncooperative stance,

even the unpertur-

bable Dr Beckett was getting frustrated.
back to say "thanks,

but no thanks"

Dr Beckett mentioned

that he felt compelled to contact OSHA,
was probably a hollow threat,
response,

When Uretek called

knowing that this

given the typical OSHA

but cognizant that it was our only leverage.

minutes later,
called back.

somewhat to everyone's surprise,

A visit would be fine,

they had

Ten

the plant

"misunderstood"

and hoped that there was no need to notify OSHA.

At the

time it was concluded that the employer was simply unaware
of OSHA's impotence,

and ignorantly timorous.

Unbeknownst

to anyone in the clinic was the fact that Uretek was
awaiting sentencing as the first convicted violator of the
state's toxic waste disposal act,
a possible 15 year jail term.

and Mr Andrews was

facing

A meeting was arranged for

November 6th.
By the time that the plant visit occurred Dr Cullen had
received a worrisome phone call
of the Hispanic community.

from a clinic in the heart

They'd seen an unusual number of

gastro-intestinal problems that fall,
thoughts?

did Cullen have any

Concern about the remaining employees was running

high on the cold November morning of the plant tour,

and

although the clinic staff had seen some gritty workplaces,
Uretek was surprisingly bad.

Gary Dorsey,

feature writer

'
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for The Hartford Courant,

paints an accurate portrait,

at

least from outside:
The factory was almost hidden by trees, sitting
like an overbaked brick wedged into the eastern
banks of the Quinnipiac
River.
From across the
water it looked like a rust-colored vestige of a
New England industrial era whose time had passed.
Tool and Die.
Cut and Sew.
Weave and Spin.
Stockpiles of rotting, trash-filled drums,
boarded-up windows, and tangles of weeds and
vines signaled abandonment.
But the exterior appearance masked the intensity of activity
on the inside.

Much reassurance and persuasion was required

to establish what chemicals were used in the plant.
first claiming that he did not know,
a list of chemical names:
Chlorobenzene,

Toluene,

Andrews eventually gave

Dimethyl Formamide,

and Methyl Ethyl Ketone,

polyurethane or clean machinery.

At

all used to make

There was also reluctance

about a walkthrough but Beckett and Sparer prevailed upon
Andrews and company attorney Clifford Grandjean.
Uretek was ready for the inspection,
thought they were.

or at least they

Employees were wearing new looking vapor

masks and safety glasses,

or could be seen putting them on

as we walked through the plant.

Trash pails were filled

with the boxes the safety equipment came in and it was
fairly obvious that they'd never been worn before:
everything in the plant,

including the workers,

was covered

with layers of dried polyurethane except for the safety
equipment.

The air was thick with organic vapor sufficient

to cause a headache and light-headedness amongst those on

.
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the tour.8
urethane,

Workers were standing by open drums of poly¬
ladling it onto fabric travelling by on rollers.

No one wore gloves.

Ventilation consisted of a

fans which were turned off,
urethane was mixed.

few window

even in the shed where the

The area of strongest fumes was around

the ovens through which the fabric passed to dry
photos).

(see

There were exhaust hoods over the ovens but it was

clear from the smell that much organic vapor was ending up
inside the shop.9

Unfortunately Ms.

permitted to make measurements,
eyes.

Sparer,

stated:

Sparer was not

other than with her nose and

an OSHA hygienist before coming to Yale,

"It was what we'd call,

at OSHA,

a real pit."10

The walk through also revealed several other facts:
all but a

few workers,

who numbered sixty-six,

Hispanic,

and most did not speak English.

were

Few seemed aware

of the hazards at the workplace - they warmed their lunches
in the solvent ovens and ate them as they ladled poly¬
urethane onto the fabric.

It was also clear that the plant

had not been inspected recently.

It was dark,

hot,

cluttered with open drums of chemicals everywhere and lacked
safety showers,

eyewash stations,

and other rudimentary

safety equipment.
A report was prepared and sent to Uretek on Novem¬
ber 19.

It recommended immediate installation of ventila¬

tion and safety equipment and a blood screening program to
evaluate all employees for liver abnormalities.

The

.
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company's initial reluctance was replaced by quiet coopera¬
tion and two days later they invited physicians back to talk
with workers about the blood tests.

The first screening

occurred in early December and on December 5th,
results trickled in from the lab:

30 of 45

some abnormality in their liver enzymes,
more than twice normal.
unprecedented outbreak,
Zimmerman and others.
concerned,

production manager,

individuals had

about 33% of them

An isolated problem had become an
contradicting the wisdom of
The clinic staff was more than

they were alarmed.

afternoon at 4:45 p.m.

a Friday,

Dr Beckett phoned Uretek that

and described the situation to the

recommending that the plant shut down

until ventilation equipment already ordered could be
installed.

The manager stated that Uretek would comply.11

In the ensuing months the clinic completed an epidemio¬
logical

study of the workers and an environmental

the workplace.

The results of the clinic study are

presented below,
survey,

survey of

while the findings of the environmental

primarily concerning DMF,

constitute the next

chapter.

Methods:

Based on the cases seen in clinic,

the blood drawn

for the screening was tested for the following:
gamma-glutamyl transpeptidase,
alkaline phosphatase,
and albumin.

AST,

ALT,

direct and total bilirubins,

lactic dehydrogenase,

total protein,

Individual liver function test results and an

'
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interpretation,

along with a questionnaire to determine

demographic background,

job history,

and symptoms were sent

to all workers in English and Spanish.

Workers with AST or

ALT greater than twice normal were referred to the occupa¬
tional medicine clinic,
be seen.

along with anyone else who wished to

Clinic evaluation consisted of history and

physical exam,
serologies,

Liver Function Tests,

a complete blood count,

partial thromboplastin time.
included BUN,

creatinine,

Hepatitis A & B
prothrombin time and

Additional blood tests

glucose and electrolytes.

Five had

abdominal ultrasounds and liver biopsies.

Screening results:
58 of 66 employees

Ultimately,

medical data was obtained on

(see Figure #1).

As the company provided

only names,

but not job classification or length of

employment,

this information was collected by questionnaire

or during a clinic visit
employment was 40 months,
for three months or less.
with a mean of 33 years.

(only 46 of 58).

Average length of

although 15 of 46
The age range was

(33%)

had worked

from 18 to 60

Workers who had worked in

production anytime in the preceding six months were
considered production workers,
but three Hispanic.

all of whom were male,

all

These individuals worked five 12-hour

shifts plus one or two 8-hour shifts per week.12

The

remaining twelve workers were classified as non-production inspecting,

packing,

shipping,

or office workers.

A third
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were Hispanic,

two female.

The eight individuals who did

not participate were non-production personnel.
Overall,
AST or ALT,

36 or 62% of workers tested had an abnormal

19 or 33% had one or more tests greater than

twice normal and 9 or 16% had one test greater than fivefold
normal

(see Figure #2).

As shown in Figure

#2,

enzyme

elevation correlated with job classification with 11 of 12
non-production workers entirely normal,

while 35 or 76% of

production workers showed an elevation.

Mean ALT for non¬

production workers was 30 ± 7 U/L versus 113
significant difference
interest,

(p<

.01)

±

171 U/L,

by Student's T-test.

a

Of

the data demonstrate an inverse correlation

between transaminase level and duration of employment with
short-term workers showing the greatest abnormality
#3).

As a longitudinal study was not possible,

information could be collected on this
reported on the questionnaire were 1)GI
pain,

or nausea)

3)Alcohol

in 67%,

intolerance

terized by facial

2)CNS

issue.

no further
Symptoms

(anorexia,

abdominal

(headaches,dizziness)

("disulfiram-like reaction"

flushing,

(Figure

palpitations,

nausea)

in 39%,

charac¬
in 24%.

All workers with elevations were either removed or trans¬
ferred to non-production areas.
modifications were completed,
workers went out on strike

Before engineering

the majority of the production

(two months after initial

screening - see next chapter).
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Medical evaluation and follow-up:

Four workers were

evaluated in clinic before the screening and 23 following
it,

including all nineteen of those with enzymes twice

normal.

Viral serologies showed all 27 with negative

hepatitis B surface antigen and negative hepatitis A IgM
antibody.

Two had positive hepatitis B surface and core

antibody indicating immunity subsequent to a past infection.
None had received blood transfusions or were using prescrip¬
tion medication.

Only two acknowledged significant alcohol

or illicit drug use.

The five hepatic ultrasounds performed

were negative.
The interpretation of the liver biopsies proved to be
controversial.

They were performed from two to eleven

months after initial screening in the five cases that
demonstrated persistent enzyme elevation.

They all revealed

microscopic changes consistent with resolving toxic injury
to the liver.

These included focal steatosis,

spotty

unicellular necrosis and evidence of diffuse regeneration,
including irregular liver cell plates, binucleated hepatocytes and variation in nuclear size and staining charac¬
teristics.

A fat stain of a frozen section

revealed

diffuse steatosis in a microvesicular pattern not evident on
the conventional paraffin sections.

Only one biopsy showed

evidence of a chronic process evidenced by scattered
acidophilic bodies,

aggregates of mononuclear inflammatory

cells within sinusoids,

and replacement of individual

.
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hepatocytes by inflammatory infiltrate.
fibrosis.

However,

as Dossing (1986)

There was no

points out:

Except for a few rare causes of hepatotoxicity
such as vinyl chloride and methylene dianiline
there is no specific or even typical clinical,
chemical, or pathological feature of occupational
hepatotoxicity. (131)
The biopsies were reviewed by a number of pathologists,
including Hyman Zimmerman, the hepatic authority who had
pronounced industrial toxic hepatitis a vestige of the past.
He found all the biopsies consistent with a diagnosis of
Non-A, Non-B hepatitis,

a relatively uncommon form of viral

or infectious hepatitis for which there is no test in
clinical use.

Non-A Non-B hepatitis is usually transmitted

in North America by blood products,
tattooing,

etc.

needle sharing,

There are only a handful of epidemic

outbreaks none of which occurred in the First world.
the cluster of cases in one workplace,
factors

(i.e.

Given

the lack of risk

IV drugs or transfusions)

and the acknowledged

low incidence of Non-A Non-B hepatitis Dr Zimmerman's
interpretation seems unlikely.13
pathologists varied widely:

Conclusions of the Yale

several felt that all biopsies

showed signs of toxic workplace injury,

others felt one or

more represented Non-A Non-B based on particular features.
It should be pointed out that,

as with toxic hepatitis,

the

diagnosis of Non-A Non-B is not based on any published study
of the microscopic appearance of various hepatitides,
only on the pathologists'

own judgement.

but

While the value of

'
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tissue and the opinion of a skilled pathologist in reaching
a diagnosis is unquestionable,

it is often ascribed an

importance that exceeds the limits of scientific certainty.
The case of the worker's biopsy with chronic inflammatory
infiltrate is illustrative.

This worker,

an 18-year-old

with a two-month exposure history and AST/ALT of 313/582 at
screening and 49/156 in October 1987

(11 months later), has

been denied workers' compensation based on one pathologist's
diagnosis of Non A Non B.

While pathologists may recognize

that the pattern of injury does not unambiguously reveal the
cause of injury,

and while debate is healthy,

the consequen¬

ces of denied compensation are far from academic for this
worker.

Conflicting standards of proof in clinico-epidemio-

logical versus laboratory medicine and in the legal/ad¬
ministrative sphere appear frequently.

Epidemiology seeks

to discern causes in the pattern of clusters of cases not
individuals.

Pathology focuses on individual cases and is

fairly indifferent to probabilistic thinking and new
disease patterns until widely accepted.

The courts

establish cause by the definition "it is more likely than
not that A caused B" which in practice can translate to A
caused B, yes or no.

When these three views of causation

collide the outcome for the individual can be unsatisfactory
and unfair.14
being appealed.

The case of the 18 year old Uretek worker is

.
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Most workers' enzymes resolved to normal levels within
one to five months of removal or transfer.

Eight in¬

dividuals had enzyme abnormalities which persisted six
months or longer and three,

including the 18-year-old,

remain elevated in March 1988, but all seem to be resolving,
if more slowly, than most affected workers.

Discussion:

The epidemiological study, while not perfect,

provides strong evidence that Uretek represents an outbreak
of work-related liver disease.
force,

Given the nature of the work

largely non-English speaking and in some cases

transient,

and the limitations imposed by the employer,

the

/S

amount of information gathered in impressive.

Three factors

point to a chemical at work as the causative agent:
proportion affected
seriously)

(76% of production workers,

l)the

33%

2)the significant difference between production

and non-production workers

(the one affected non-production

worker showed very mild elevations)

3)the lack of risk

factors infectious or other forms of hepatic injury.

With

regard to this last point, doubts might be cast on the
reliability of self-reported alcohol consumption.

A study

published in 1979 in Digestive Diseases demonstrated that an
AST/ALT ratio of 2 or greater is "highly suggestive of
alcoholic hepatitis and cirrhosis.1,15

The test was

particularly helpful in cases where ALT was less than 300,
the moderate sort of elevation seen in most Uretek workers.

. '

.
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In the 1979 study,

91% of patients with alcoholic liver

disease had an AST/ALT ratio greater than 1.0.16
shows a graph of AST/ALT ratios

Figure #4

for all Uretek workers with

elevation - only 1 of 36 was greater than 1.0.

While no

biochemical assay is specific enough to allow definitive
conclusions,

this result does not contradict the workers'

self-reports of minimal to moderate alcohol consumption
(except in two cases of self-reported abuse).
Another issue which raises some doubts

is the inconsis¬

tency between presumed degree of exposure and liver injury.
In the absence of dosage measurements one might assume that
length of employment might be correlated with illness.
the Uretek case,

however,

elevated liver function tests were

clustered in workers of short tenure,
#3.

In

as shown in Figure

There are several possible explanations.

First,

there

is almost certainly a variability in the hepatic sensitivity
to environmental toxins,

though we would expect to find it

randomly distributed amongst the workers if this were the
sole factor responsible for the cluster of greater sen¬
sitivity in new workers.
effect",
plant,

that is,

Second,

there is a

"healthy worker

workers who had severe reactions left the

or as in Betancourt's case

Statisiticians call this

(and others),

"selection bias".

of most new workers was so well-known,

fired.

The intolerance

in fact,

that the

old-timers ran a betting pool to see who could predict how
long a new man would last.

This could explain the presence

35

Outbreak
of highly sensitive individuals in the recently employed
group,

while veterans showed much milder elevations.

The

fact that no records were kept on the number of workers who
quit or were terminated makes it impossible to find the
missing cohort of workers who left due to illness.17
final possibility is that Figure #3
history of the disease process,

A

represents the natural

which involves acute injury

followed by a period of gradual resolution.

Which of these

factors is responsible for the observed pattern and to what
degree is impossible to ascertain with the cross-sectional
data collected.

All of the symptoms reported and signs

observed are consistent with toxic injury due to chemicals
used at Uretek.

Outbreak
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WORKPLACE PHOTOS:
As none were permitted on the initial
visit, all of the photographs were taken after the installa¬
tion of recommended ventilation equipment.
The left hand
photo shows the primary means of ventilation before the
changes.
Many of these fans did not work.
The one on the
right shows the apppearance of the shop after it was cleaned
up and safety equipment installed.

■
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These two photos show the polyurethane mixture being pumped
from a barrel onto the fabric as it travels through rollers
and on to the drying oven.
The horizontal bar with flexible
tubing is part of the new local ventilation system.

Outbreak
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The top photo displays a worker wearing measurement
instruments standing near oven.
The bottom photo shows
another worker with vapor mask standing at "new" machine
(note skin exposure).
Formerly this worker stood next to a
barrel of polyurethane and ladled it onto the fabric
"knife".

.
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LFTS
Normal (N=11)
Production
(N=46)
Evaluated

< Twice Normal
(N=17)
> Twice Normal
(N = 19)

All Employees
(N=66)
Normal (N=11)
Non-Production
(N=12)

< Twice Normal
(N=1)
> Twice Normal

FIGURE 11: Flow chart showing LFT data obtained on the
workers.
LFT's were collected on 58 out of 66 total
employees.
46 of these were production workers; 12 were
non-production workers.
Of the 46 production workers 11 had
normal liver enzymes; 35 had one or more elevated trans¬
aminases.
Of the 12 non-production workers 11 had normal
liver enzymes and only one had mild elevations.

*
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UVER ENZYMES IN PRODUCTION AND NON PRODUCTION WORKERS
Production Workers (46)
mean ALT=113 (±172) SD

Non Production Workers (12)
mean ALT=30 (±7) SD

Number
of
Workers

LFTS

FIGURE #2: Frequency distribution of workers with liver
abnormalities. The graph shows numbers of production and
non-production workers with AST or ALT values greater than
or less than twice normal.

Outbreak
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FIGURE #3: Relationship between months of employment and ALT
in production workers who had completed the questionnaire
(N=32).
Months of employment was determined on the basis of
questionnaire data and calculated from month of initial hire
to the date liver function tests were drawn.
ALT used was
from the initial screening or from the first clinic visit if
the patient had continued exposure after the screening test.

.
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Number
of
Patients

Ratio of AST to ALT

FIGURE _i4i.Frequency distribution of the ratio of AST to ALT
i*"1 production workers (N=3 6) with one or more elevated
transaminases.
If the patient had more than one set of
liver enzymes, the set with the highest AST and ALT was
used.
The ratio of AST to ALT was less than or equal to one
m all but one patient, the opposite of the ratio normally
seen in alcoholic disease.
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Endnotes

1.

Mitchell et al.

2.

This is the patients actual name as his identity has
been previously revealed, with informed consent, in
numerous press accounts.

3.

A computerized search of the clinic records revealed
that an Hispanic Uretek worker was seen in 1984.
No
liver function tests were done and the patients
symptoms resolved and were presumed to be viral
gastro-enteritis.
In retrospect, they probably
represented solvent effects.

4.

Chapter five on the history of federal and state
legislation will deal more extensively with these issues.

5.

Fellows have completed a three year residency training
program and are seeking two to three years of sub¬
specialty training in occupational medicine and public
health.

6.

Dorsey

7.

Ibid.

8.

Because no air level measurements were permitted by
the company, it is not known if levels exceeded the
OSHA limit of 10 ppm.

9.

The amount ending up outside qualified Uretek as a
"big guy" among Connecticut polluters according to
Steve Peplau, a senior air pollution control engineer
with the state.
Peplau estimated discharge into the
air "around 300 tons per year." Quoted in Dorsey (1987).

10.

Ibid.

11.

Later it was revealed that Uretek kept the night shift
running on unventilated machines until the strike shut
the plant down in February.

12.

As they were generally paid minimum wage,
the major attraction of work at Uretek.

.

13

(1987),

266.

see also D0ssing

(1986).

(1987) .

overtime was

Dienstag et al. in Harrison's Principles of Internal
Medicine, 11th edition, 1987, 1325.

.
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14.

See also Brennan & Carter (1985) Legal and Scientific
Probability of Causation of Cancer and Other Environ¬
mental Disease In Individuals and chapter six.

15.

Cohen & Kaplan

16.

Ibid.

17.

Rumors abounded of workers who had returned to Puerto
Rico where they could afford medical care.
They almost
certainly were not identified as victims of occupation¬
al disease.

(1979)

45

CHAPTER THREE:

DMF AND THE WORKPLACE

As previously described,

Uretek was engaged in the

production of polyurethane coatings and their application to
fabric.

Of the list of chemicals provided by Uretek,

only

one chemical had been identified already as a hepatotoxin,
Dimethyl Formamide
Chlorobenzene,

(DMF).

Toluene,

role in the outbreak,

While the other compounds.

and Methyl Ethyl Ketone might have a

particularly as synergists,

only a few studies documenting hepatotoxicity,
primarily in animals.

there are

and then

A toxicological study will be

necessary to establish with greater certainty the health
effects of DMF.

Like most industrial compounds,

been studied in combination with other chemicals,
exception of alcohol.

However,

DMF has not
with the

enough is known about DMF to

make a convincing argument that it is at least partly if not
entirely the cause of the hepatotoxicity at Uretek.
An excellent and versatile solvent,

DMF is used

ubiquitously in polyurethane products and acrylic fibers
(65-75%)

as well as pharmaceuticals

among other applications.

(15-20%)

and pesticides,

It is an extremely important

solvent known for its excellent solubility of a wide variety
of organic and inorganic compounds.

Approximately one third

of the world's capacity to produce acrylic fibers depends on
DMF.1

First synthesized in 1893,

DMF only came into

.
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widespread commercial use in the early 1940's.

It was

generally considered non-toxic by research groups associated
with manufacturers until very recently.
Although US production was estimated at 33 million
pounds in 1979,

and worldwide output at 106 million pounds,

the number of workers exposed is unknown.2

A recent report

from the occupational medicine program at Mt.

Sinai hospital

in New York contains an estimate of over 100,000 U.S.
workers exposed to DMF currently,
Santodonato,

et al

(1985),

or in the last decade.3

note that with the large quantity

produced and the number of applications,

"exposure would

appear to be quite widespread."4
A review of the literature failed to turn up specific
data on the pharmacokinetics of DMF absorption,

except for a

Japanese study indicating that trans-dermal absorption is
significant.5

There is consensus that respiratory and

gastric absorption occurs.
Methylformamide

(MMF)

DMF is metabolized to N-

and N-Hydroxymethyl-Methylformamide.6

In humans exposed to DMF,

N-Methylformamide has been

reported as the principal urinary metabolite and has been
proposed,

along with elevated urinary mercaptopurines,

means of biological monitoring in workers.7

as a

Studies

demonstrate a directly proportional relationship between
total exposure and urinary MMF,

though MMF fell to undetec¬

table levels within 14 hours of exposure.8
not correlate well with exposure,

however,

Spot urines do
and there is

.
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great variability if urine levels in exposed individuals.
Some critics of the Uretek study have argued that urine
testing should have been done to establish DMF as the
causative agent.

Measurement of MMF excretion in Uretek

workers would have required 24 hour urine collection and
would have helped to establish DMF as the causitive agent.
However,

the conclusions would not have been altered as

workers had tangible dermal and respiratory exposure
sufficient to account for the findings.
Toxicological studies have established that DMF is
hepatotoxic in cats,

mice,

rats,

guinea pigs,

and rabbits,

causing a centrilobular necrosis and fatty degeneration.9
Reports involving humans have been surprisingly few and
generally involve one or two cases in a given workplace.
All but one case reported occurred outside the United
States.10
nausea,
and,

All the human studies document abdominal pain,

vomiting,

dizziness,

in a few cases,

headaches,

agitation.

anorexia,

diarrhea,

Liver function tests were

rarely evaluated except in two studies which documented
elevations after large accidental exposures.11
"disulfiram-like"

The

effect of DMF has long been recognized and

is attributed to possible acetaldehyde inhibition by MMF.12
The ubiquity and high toxicity of DMF poses the
question of why so few cases of hepatic injury appear in the
literature.

The lone U.S.

case report occurred in a

Pennsylvania Urethane coating plant.13

Conditions at Uretek
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certainly may have been worse than average,

and the

recommended precautions may be better observed in other
operations

(manufacturers now recommend skin and respiratory

protection).

Even the Pennsylvania plant had instituted

periodic LFT assays as far back as 1972.
todonato,
of DMF,

et al

(1985),

However,

San-

points out that solvent applications

such as cleaning of machinery,

"are likely to be

conducted with few or no engineering controls,
undoubtedly resulting in worker exposure."

thus

The National

Cancer Institute report concludes prophetically with the
following paragraph:
There are no reports of well-designed epidemio¬
logic studies on worker groups exposed to
Dimethylformamide.
Case reports from the foreign
literature have associated DMF exposure with
increased morbidity from various causes.
Worker
exposure to DMF during acrylic fiber production is
apparently sufficient to justify consideration of
this cohort for further investigation.
Exposures
of similar or greater magnitude may occur in
other industries (e.g. pharmaceutical production,
chemical synthesis), although cohorts are likely
to be small and simultaneous exposure to multiple
chemicals is likely to occur.
Tolot

(1968)

concluded that:

The frequency of these symptoms is probably quite
widespread, probably greater than one might
anticipate in view of the relative silence which
surrounds the question in France, a silence which
should be deplored.

With Uretek,
been broken.

the silence in the U.S.

surrounding DMF has

There are signs that DMF and methylamines are

already subjects of national

interest and controversy.

■
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The Uretek outbreak coincided with the publication of
the first adequate studies of DMF carcinogenicity.
1986,

Prior to

short-term mutagenicity and genotoxicity studies were

negative and an animal bioassay was

in progress.

reported chromosome damage in DMF workers,
significance had not been established.14
Uretek has not been good.

One study

but the health
The news since

An unpublished 32-year prospec¬

tive study of 5,000 workers by a DuPont epidemiologist
released in September 1986 documented significant excesses
of bucco-pharyngeal and malignant melanoma in DMF-exposed
cohorts,

and an excess of prostate cancer in a cohort

exposed to DMF plus Acrylonitrile

(ACN).15

In October 1986

a report appeared in the Journal of Urology describing
clusters of embryonal cell carcinomas of the testis in two
separate aircraft repair facilities among mechanics who had
worked extensively with DMF.16
December 1987,

Fourteen months later,

in

a letter appeared in The Lancet describing

three cases of testicular cancer in tannery workers exposed
to DMF.

Since then two additional cases have been iden¬

tified by researchers at Mt Sinai Medical Center in New
York.

The Mt.

Sinai researchers and a labor union peti¬

tioned federal agencies to issue a bulletin warning workers
of potential carcinogenicity of DMF.17

All of these recent

developments point to even greater hazards from DMF than the
risk of hepatotoxicity highlighted by the Uretek outbreak.

*
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Uretek workers are being informed of these recently reported
risks by the Yale clinic staff.
A coincidental report received by the author indicates
that there may even be a DMF hazard to the general public.
Ellen Silbergeld,

PhD senior scientist for the Washington-

based Environmental Defense Fund,

reports that the EPA has

recently licensed an algicide/herbicide which breaks down
into MMF.

This product,

marketed as Sonar

(Fluridone),

is

not the only licensed cidal agent which includes MMF as a
degradation product.

However,

the EPA felt that Fluridone

is sufficiently safe to justify use as an algicide in
drinking water reservoirs.
York,

The township of Lake George,

New

has already attempted to employ it for this purpose,

though it is being opposed by citizens'
Dr Silbergeld to testify.

groups who called on

The EPA has declined to review

its classification in light of the new cancer reports even
though they acknowledge that they were not aware of them
when they approved the product.

Dr.

Silbergeld has

recommended that the EPA's research arm,
undertake a new study of Fluridone.

the NIEHS,

Clearly the safety of

DMF and its metabolites will be significant issues in the
coming months and years.
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CHAPTER FOUR:

THE STRIKE AND THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

By the end of January the conflict between the needs of
workers fired or unable to work and those still on the job
had come to a head.

Beth Lewis,

the clinic social worker,

was exasperated with unsuccessful attempts to get groceries,
clothes,
was

and benefits for the workers.

While the company

installing the requested engineering controls,

also contesting the

workers'

they were

compensation claims.

They had

even gone so far as to hire the director of occupational
health at Yale University.

Deborah McGregor MD MPH

(no

affiliation to the Yale Occupational Medicine Program)
consultant.1
findings,

as a

She proceeded to dispute the clinic's

claiming that the outbreak was due to alcohol and

tylenol abuse.

Uretek was not the paragon of cooperation

despite their claims of such to the media.

Ms Lewis also

recognized that there were more issues to resolve than just
those involving health and safety.

Workers had no benefits,

were required to work 12-hour shifts,
indiscriminately.

and were fired

They needed more help than the clinic or

an attorney could provide.

The program staff agreed that

Lewis should seek contacts in "the Hispanic community."

It

happened that Daniel Perez had recently arrived in New Haven
as an organizer for the International Ladies Garment Workers
Union

(ILGWU)

and Lewis'

inquiries quickly led her to Perez.
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Within 72 hours an overwhelming majority of Uretek workers
authorized the ILGWU to represent them in what was to be the
prelude to a bitter four-month strike.
OSHA,

the media,

and the mayor.

Perez called on

He obtained benefits

for

the workers and demonstrated an tireless perspicacity that
even Uretek's owners ultimately came to respect.

The Big Story
The Uretek story hit local papers and television on
February 19,

1987.

A week later a report of the medical

details appeared in the Center of Disease Control's
Morbidity and Mortality weekly report.
followed,

In the weeks that

the story was picked up by the Boston Globe,

New York Times,

and other major papers.

finding out who knew what,

and when.

the

Reporters set about

It wasn't long before

documents were uncovered which indicated that Uretek had
been investigated by both state and federal

inspectors years

before the outbreak.
The OSHA inspection,

which covered only safety regula¬

tions and not health rules,
found 11 safety violations.

occurred in February of 1979 and
The safety inspector,

ciently concerned about toxic health risks,

suffi¬

recommended a

separate health inspection and requested a list of chemicals
from company vice-president and chief chemist,

John Andrews,

despite the fact that he had been sent to examine safety

Strike & Response
compliance only.

54
Andrews responded with a letter listing

eight coating names,

but stating that "the exact chemical

composition of the coatings is unknown to us,

as the

suppliers consider the coatings as proprietary".2

Andrews

stated that he was assured by manufacturers that the
coatings did not contain any "unduly hazardous or toxic
chemicals that would affect the safety of the people working
in the plant".3

OSHA supervisors,

no further requests and,

evidently satisfied,

until the outbreak,

made

a health

inspection was never performed.
The state,
Uretek.

as it turned out,

Inspectors

virtually stumbled into

from the state Department of Environmen¬

tal Protection inspected the Chem-Tech Rubber Company in May
of 1984

for hazardous waste storage compliance.

Chem-Tech

occupies the ground floor above the Uretek basement
operation and is owned by the same individual,
One inspector,

Peter Zack,

Harold Hoder.

was so overwhelmed by the

chemical odors that he noted in his report that anyone from
DEP "should have respirators to ensure
safety and health".
division,

[the inspectors's]

He also contacted DEP's air compliance

recommending that they investigate possible air

pollution problems outside the plant.

No one ever followed

up on the suggestion.
Zack did,
was

however,

document that Uretek's storage yard

full of leaking drums of Toluene,

and Dimethyl Formamide.

Methyl Ethyl Ketone,

He later substantiated that the
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company improperly disposed of hundreds of gallons of toxic
waste by selling it to a fuel blending company.

This fact,

combined with the deceptions and uncooperativeness of Uretek
management,

led Zack,

in November of 1984,

to refer the case

to the Attorney General's office.
While this case was being argued,

the state DEP air

compliance division finally found Uretek because of
complaints by neighborhood residents of strong odors.
discovered,

as already mentioned,

pollutants at a remarkable rate.

They

that Uretek was emitting
Gary Dorsey describes the

situation at that point:
Negotiations were held, compliance orders served.
But change was slow.
The bureaucracy worked over
Uretek according to traditional labyrinthine
scheduling.
Seventeen months later, when the
occupational medicine program brought Uretek to a
standstill, the state was still dickering with the
company about its air pollution and hazardous
waste problems.4

The Government Response
From the revelations of the preceding section,

it is

perhaps no surprise that a number of state and federal
officials found themselves in the hot seat.
revelations of state inspectors'

Although the

concerns were embarrassing,

Uretek primarily served as an opportunity for state
officials to score political points,

as the state had no

jurisdiction over health matters in the plant.

State

Attorney Joseph Lieberman was an early critic and lost no

'
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time in emphasizing his pursuit of Uretek in court since
1984 for hazardous waste violations.
Haven,

Biagio DiLieto,

The mayor of New

attempted unsuccessfully to act as a

mediator in the strike.
Political pressure at the state level focused on state
Superior Court Justice Thomas P. Maino, who had delayed
reaching a verdict in the original hazardous waste case for
more than two years.

What could have been a quiet back-page

decision became the object of close scrutiny by the public,
by other factory owners and by politicians.

Uretek faced

possible fines of $50,000 per day for 100 days of violations
from May 15 to August 22,

1984, which totalled $5,000,000.

Vice-president Andrews faced a personal fine of $5,000,000
and a 5-year prison term.

On April 14 the judge found

Uretek guilty and levied fines of $225,000 and $5,000 fines
against Uretek and Andrews,
prison sentence.

respectively.5

There was no

Uretek became the first company in the

state convicted of hazardous waste violations in a criminal
court.6

Although Judge Maino's decision was criticized by

some as lenient,

there is some belief that the penalty

would have been smaller had it not been for the hepatitis
outbreak.7

The decision set an important precedent in the

state for criminal penalties in toxic waste cases.

57

Strike & Response
Federal Hot Potato
If there was discomfort at the state level,
near panic in federal circles.

U.S.

there was

Senator Lowell P.

Weicker hand-delivered a letter to Labor Secretary Brock in
March complaining about OSHA's 10-week inspection backlog.
The New England OSHA director, John B. Miles, Jr., who had
jurisdiction over Connecticut, had assumed his post two
weeks before the Uretek story hit the press in mid-February.
Unknown at the time was the fact that Miles had previously
been director of the prestigious Manhattan OSHA office.

He

had been "reassigned" in March of 1986 after an internal
probe of the Pymm Thermometer Factory outbreak of mercury
poisoning,
causes),

in which several workers died

(of unsubstantiated

and at least forty others were seriously affected.8

It was Miles' bad luck to be transferred into an explosive
situation, but he responded with unusual vigor,

requesting

"loaner" inspectors from OSHA's Emergency Health Response
Team in Salt Lake City,

and calling on Dr. Ralph Yodaiken,

one of two OSHA staff physicians,
health records.

to review the workers'

The latter is extremely unusual for OSHA,

which has no provision for involvement of medical personnel
in local

work.

On July 28,

1987,

six months after they

were notified, OSHA cited Uretek for 34 willful and 145
serious violations of the OSH Act.9
$480,000 were proposed,

Fines totalling

including $10,000 each for the 34

willful violations and $1,000 each for the 136 serious
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all the maximum allowable by law.

Given that

the average proposed OSHA penalty is less than $100,
less than $900 for willful violations,
fines were notably harsh.10

and

the proposed Uretek

They came at a time when OSHA

was increasingly under fire for alleged inactivity.

Of

note, both the company and its new ally after the strike,
the union,

contested the proposed fines.11
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE HISTORY
FEDERAL STATE AND PRIVATE REGULATION
OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

At first glance the term occupational
seems to be a single concept.

However,

safety and health

ensuring health in

the workplace means prevention of disease;

workplace safety

involves prevention of accidents and resulting injuries.
There are several
jury distinction.

important implications of the disease/in¬
The first,

and most important,

the thorny issue of causation.

Normally,

involves

the causes of

injuries are temporally proximate and established with ease
in comparison with disease,
In the case of the latter,
tal,

decades,

or involve threshold

Results sometimes do not manifest for years or

and other causal

influences clog the intervening

(Disease is a result of a complex interplay between

internal
then,

causal events are often incremen¬

diffused over months or years,

exposures.

time.

especially occupational disease.

[host]

and external

[environment]).

It follows,

that the study of occupational disease is the

characterization of disease clusters,
primarily that of epidemiology.
other hand,

and the methodology is

The study of injury,

on the

is the characterization of random events which

occur with a certain probability,
statistical methods.1

established primarily by

While the study of occupational

injury has included the "injury-prone worker"

as well as the
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dangerous workplace, the host/environment interplay is much
more complex.
Historically, the distinction is important,

as we shall

see, because of the difficulty institutions originally
designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents have had
accommodating to occupational disease.

In the case of

worker's compensation, the problem has been one of a round
peg in a square hole.

The result is that very few workers

are receiving compensation for work-related diseases.
same difficulty can be seen with OSHA.
word "health" in its name,

The

While it has the

it was never designed to detect

or prevent health problems:
OSHA's role, then and now, is to make rules about
how work should be done safely and to enforce
them, much like police.
OSHA is not equipped to
assess whether someone is hurt or sick, but
whether rules are broken.2
This theme will recur as the historical roots of occupation¬
al health in Connecticut are traced in this chapter:
and state laws,

federal

and the influence of the early voluntary

groups on these institutions.

A further treatment of the

implications of the accident/disease in prevention and
identification of workplace problems is included in chapter
six.
Unhappily, the history of sick and injured workers is
long, back to the beginning of recorded history.
this long history,

Throughout

attention has primarily been directed to

industrial accidents,

not to workplace disease.3

It is

.
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curious the explosion of medical knowledge in the last
thirty years,

and its application in many new arenas has not

led to a renaissance of occupational health.

While a

veritable mountain of medical writing has appeared on
tobacco,
health,

alcohol, diet,

exercise and their influence on

not to mention literature on a plethora of new

diseases, most of the profession has been strangely silent
about occupational illness.

Perhaps,

as some have asserted

this is due to a decline in the real incidence of industrial
disease?

While deaths on the job have certainly decreased

since 1900,

this seems less certain for non-fatal diseases.

Even with the shift in the 1980's to a "service compounds
and processes has vastly increased the number and severity
of exposure to hazards.4

It will be argued in the next

chapter that the lack of medical literature on workplace
disease reflects a failure to recognize it when it occurs,
and that this in turn is due to a complex set of factors,
not all of them medical.
Perhaps the media's conclusion blaming the outbreak
primarily on irresponsible owners, dangerous chemicals,

and

a weakened OSHA is sufficient to partly answer the question
why such an outbreak occurred.

A complete answer though,

one that provides meaningful information for the future,
benefits from a look at institutions which existed in the
past and how they functioned.

The goal is an analysis which

recognizes that events do not occur in a vacuum but in a
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and that individuals and their actions influence

and are influenced by societal structures and institutions
in a complex way.5

For one, the nature of preventing

workplace injury and disease involves economic,
ethical,

and social judgments.

In addition,

political,

the particular

judgments made by legislators and bureaucrats are buried in
the maze of official documents or obtuse administrative
manuals.

The net result is a remote,

times daunting subject,

inaccessible and at

and understandably,

have been made to untangle the issues.

few attempts

In fact,

few widely

available books have been written on the history of the
Federal OSH act itself,

although a number of critiques of

OSHA have appeared dealing primarily with the function of
the act which include brief historical treatment.6

To fill

this gap in the literature is beyond the scope of this
modest undertaking.

The focus of this chapter will be to

fill a narrower but heretofore unexamined gap:

the history

of occupational health in Connecticut, which by necessity
will include public and private efforts on the national
level.
Turning to the early 1900's we find it was a simpler
time in occupational health to be sure,
owners.

at least for company

No national health or safety legislation existed.

The closest things to a federal occupational health standard
were limited efforts such as the "Esch Act of 1912", which
placed a prohibitive tax on white sulphur,

driving it out of
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Inhalation of white or yellow sulphur,

chief constituent in matches,
death or disfigurement.7

caused decay of the jaw and

Other federal health projects of

the day were the Federal Workers'
the Mine Safety Act of 1910,

Compensation Act of 1908,

and the formation of the Public

and Indian Health Services in 1914.
represented improvements,

formerly the

Although they certainly

these acts had a much greater

impact on injury than disease in the workplace,

and even

this effect was constrained to a limited number of work
sites.

The Compensation Act,

federal employees.

for example,

extended only to

The Mine Safety Act made stipulations

about construction and ventilation, but nothing was included
concerning dust masks or other health protections. The
states were just beginning to promulgate legislation at the
time,

and the scene was dominated by voluntary organizations

and medical specialists mostly under the influence of
industry.

Like the handful of public acts, voluntary

efforts that came to pass dealt primarily with safety,
is,

industrial accidents,

that

and not with diseases arising from

work.

Voluntary Efforts
NSC:

Prior to 1927, most of the regulatory work

influencing Connecticut had been through voluntary organiza¬
tions.

The first of these was the National Safety Council

*
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founded in 1912 by prominent industrialists as a

response to the alarming rates of accidental death and
disfigurement that accompanied the proliferation of powerful
machinery.8

Known today primarily for their automobile and

bicycle safety campaigns, the NSC expropriated the "Safety
First" slogan from United States Steel, which in 1910 had
formed its own accident reduction campaign in response to
negative publicity.

With its slogan,

the NSC took the

ideological high ground from which to focus blame "on the
careless worker rather than on corporate responsibility for
dangerous designs and practices."9

Despite the fact that

the NSC currently publishes some of the most heavily quoted
workplace morbidity and mortality data,

they have sponsored

little or no industrial research and have downplayed the
dangers of occupational disease.10
ANSI:

A second voluntary organization,

National Standards Institute
(under a different name)

the American

(ANSI), was founded in 1918

by a group of corporations and

manufacturers to "develop industrial standards through
consensus."

Part of their efforts have focused on such

issues as nut and bolt size compatibility while others have
attempted to improve occupational safety by promulgation of
standards for hazard exposures.

Since 1969 these standards

have been reviewed by a board including government and
consumer but no labor members and with 9 of the 15 members
from industry.

The board decides when a standards committee
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has reached "consensus” by weighting and counting the votes
of the members.

Unfortunately,

not made public.11

the weighting decisions are

Certainly this would all seem terribly

arcane had not 180 ANSI standards been adopted intact by
OSHA as regulations in 1971 by authority of Sec.
OSH act.12

6(a)

of the

Like the NSC, ANSI has ventured into data

collection as well, by means of its "USA standard method of
recording and measuring work injury experience-Z16.1."
Originally developed by government statisticians but taken
over by ANSI in the 1920's,

the ANSI statistics were the

only source of work injury rates in the US until the passage
of the OSH act.

Many view ANSI as seriously underestimating

accident rates, while they do not even bother to collect
disease data at all.
ACGIH:

A third organization also had a number of its

standards adopted by OSHA: the American Council of Govern¬
ment Industrial Hygienists

(ACGIH),

founded in 1938.

The

ACGIH was a professional organization, unlike the NSC and
ANSI,

and adopted standards by organizational plebiscite.

The standards take the form of Threshold Limit Values
(TLV's)

which are eight hour time weighted averages defined

as "the concentration of an airborne contaminant to which
workers may be exposed repeatedly day after day, without
adverse effects."

They are established by extrapolation

from animal toxicity studies and from reports of exposure in
workers.

OSHA adopted the 1967 ACGIH TLV's in 1971 and they

■
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had previously been adopted by a number of foreign govern¬
ments.

In addition, TLV exposure levels have been criti¬

cized for being too high.

Hollstein points out that

exposures are "considered acceptable if...[they]

cause

physiological changes in the exposed worker but the changes
are not harmful."13
monoxide,

For instance, TLV's for carbon

nitrogen oxides,

and sulfur dioxide are four to

forty times as high as the limits set by the EPA for the air
people breath when they are home from work.

The number of

ACGIH TLV's has almost doubled since 1967 and for many the
TLV has been lowered.

However, OSHA has not fundamentally

revised its inherited list.
unaltered,

As these standards were adopted

they represent one of the significant inade¬

quacies in OSHA discussed further in chapter six.
NCCI:

The final voluntary organization of note is the

National Council on Compensation Insurance

(NCCI).

Whereas

the NSC and ANSI are primarily supported by manufacturers,
NCCI represents the interests of the insurance industry.
Perhaps the last oligopoly untouched by anti-trust legisla¬
tion,

the insurance industry,

and the workings of its lobby

group, have yet to be documented in any detail.

However,

NCCI's interest in the early part of the century is fairly
clear; they vigorously promoted worker's compensation laws.
In particular, they hoped to avoid federal regulation and
underwriting and management of the funds by the states.
regard to the latter, the insurers demonstrated some

In
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foresight: worker's compensation was to be a profitable
business.
Between 1950 and 1970 private insurers have kept an
average of 40 cents of every dollar of worker's compensation
premiums in contrast with 20 cents for state funds and less
than 5 cents for the Federal Employees Compensation act.14
In 1974,

the nationwide premium benefit ratio was 0.53

47 cents to administration)
(28 cents)

(ie

for private insurers versus 0.72

for state funds.15

Even more dramatic is the

fact that five states which prohibit private compensation
insurance companies operated state funds with a 0.94
benefit/premium ratio, with Ohio out front at 0.96.16

This

means that it costs Ohio a little over 4 cents to return a
dollar in benefits, whereas it costs insurance companies 89
cents

(47 cents of cost for 53 cents benefits returned)

do the same.

to

Although state funds are exempt from taxes and

deliver fewer services than private insurers,

it appears

that broker commissions and profits figure into the
efficiency difference.
say.

Just how much profit is difficult to

As already pointed out,

the insurance industry has

enjoyed near total freedom from independent scrutiny.
sobering to consider,

as Berman points out,

It is

that "worker's

compensation benefits could be nearly doubled at no new cost
to employers by eliminating the role of the private
insurance companies."17

.
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Worker's Compensation
Although the voluntary programs eventually had a major
impact on occupational health when they were adopted as
standards in 1971, worker's compensation was far and away
the most important single factor in the area prior to OSHA.
From the beginnings of the industrial revolution in the
1870's up until the 1900's,

employers had successfully

avoided liability for worker injury and illness in the US.
Under common law,

employers were held to the "prudent

person" standard,

and expected to take due consideration of

employee safety,
hazards.

including forewarning them of unusual

In spite of this "counsel of perfection", workers

were rarely able to recover against their employer in
court.

Proof of negligence on the part of the employer is

difficult under the best of circumstances today,

and even

more difficult at the time as a result of the total
dominance of employers in the legal arena.

In addition to

the expense, delay and uncertainty of a suit,

litigants had

to contend with a number of realities of the day.

Coworkers

or a foreman who might be key witnesses would risk firing if
they testified on the workers behalf,

and even with adequate

testimony, the likelihood of a decision in the plaintiffs
favor was small given three "doctrines" accepted as adequate
defenses,
The first,

sarcastically referred to as "The Holy Trinity".18
contributory negligence,

absolved employers if
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the employee could be shown to have contributed to the
incident,

even in a minor way.

Likewise,

employees could

not collect if a coworkers;s negligence contributed,
fellow-servant doctrine.

Finally,

the

knowledgeable assumption

of risk asserted that if a hazard causing injury was
inherent to the work,

and if the worker could be expected to

have known of it, then his or her acceptance of the job
precluded negligence.

These three doctrines were inter¬

preted so liberally by the courts prior to 1900 that
results favorable to the plaintiff were very unusual.19

By

1900, however, workers began winning suits in greater
numbers.20

Progressives began publicizing the plight of

injured workers and their families,
survivors.
Survey",

or in some cases,

their

The best known of these was the "Pittsburgh

carried out by Crystal Eastman in 1907-8 which

found that employers took no financial responsibility in
over half the cases.21
cried for relief.

Most important of all, big business

In 1910 two large business associations,

the National Civic Federation and the National Association
of Manufacturers,

started to lobby for state worker's

compensation regulations.

The reasons were simple.

Although large corporations could underwrite their own
insurance funds, medium and small firms could not,
them some pooled risk scheme was needed.

and for

In addition,

businessmen recognized the desirability of a system of
preestablished and fixed payments, upon which they might

History

71

exercise some indirect control,

over one in which workers

were obtaining increasingly large jury awards that could
spell catastrophe for many companies.

Just how this

indirect control was achieved is explored in the next
section.

Another motivation of commercial support was the

fear that public perception of an injustice had reached
proportions that might spur government to alter employeremployee relations

(by invalidating the common law defenses,

as occurred in a few states)

and give the nascent union

movement an unwanted boost.
Not surprisingly,

unions opposed worker's compensation

legislation for reasons that we might expect:

their mistrust

of government interference and their expectation of improved
results in the courts.

It is also no shock that their

opposition had little impact on the course of public policy.
The theory behind the legislation was no-fault
liability,

providing prompt and adequate benefits while

relieving both employers and employees of the uncertainty
and expense of litigation.

In actuality benefits were low,

most states set maximum awards at 50% of the workers income
and although an improvement over some court awards,

the

number of high value settlements was growing in the years
preceding the legislation.22

With the acceptance of a comp

award the worker forfeited the right to a common-law suit.
The first states to pass compensation legislation.
York,

Maryland,

and Montana,

had their statutes ruled

New
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unconstitutional by the courts.

Wisconsin,

in 1911,

became

the first state to have a system which remained in effect,
followed shortly by others including Connecticut in 1914.
Twenty-four states had legislation by 1925,
until

but it was not

1948 that all states had such laws.23

excluded coverage of occupational disease,
explicitly than others.
cited.

First,

some more

Three reasons for this have been

as compensation laws were intended to

supplant common law jurisdiction,
were denied by common law,
Second,

The early laws

it was thought,

and since disease claims

no need was seen to include

perhaps correctly,

it.

that disease

compensation would be much more expensive and place a heavy
burden on industries,

such as mining,

rates were recognized by management,
responsibility.

where high disease
even if they denied

It was thought that illness could be

handled by health and disability insurance,
tributed the risk burden over a larger pool

which dis¬
(and except for

a few diseases such as asbestosis and lead toxicity,
remains to some extent today).
progressive states,

Finally,

this

in the more

the laws were written with language

sufficiently expansive to allow future coverage of illness,
but not so broad as to alarm legislators.

Massachusetts

was the first state to extend coverage in this way,
by nine others in 1928

including Connecticut,

followed

18 more in the

1940's and the remainder between 1951 and the present.

24
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To say that all states now have compensation for
occupational disease is misleading.

The compensation system

was designed to provide prompt and fair payment to victims
of workplace accidents,

and despite some significant

problems with award levels and incomplete coverage of all
employees,

the system has had some success.

Ashford points

out though that "the designers of the original
not foresee the slow,

statutes did

silent disability caused by many of

today's occupational hazards,

and the problems of recogniz¬

ing and understanding such occupational diseases have
therefore raised critical
(sic)

issues

compensation system."25

for the entire workmen's

We will

return to this point

shortly.
The compensation system is heavily flawed.
functional obstacles,
insurers,
of workers

such as

"inefficiency"

discussed in the previous section,
in general,

diseases or injuries

Some are

of private
uneven coverage

and unequal compensation of specific

from state to state.

More serious are

the flaws stemming from internal contradictions,

which in

turn reflect competing goals of the compensation system.
These flaws bear more careful attention.
Ashford identifies five "social" goals for the
compensation system and what it should ideally accomplish:
income maintenance,
coverage,

insurance,

and equity.

is not being met.

efficiency,

broad uniform

It is clear that the maintenance goal

According to data amassed by Berman in

.
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1978 from public and private sources those receiving
compensation recover only one fifth of their original income
on average.

Four-fifths entering the system receive only

medical benefits,

in part because most states require

disability for eight days or more to qualify for income
replacement.

If all of the workers entering the compensa¬

tion system in 1972 received all their lost salary,

the

amount paid out would have totalled $18.2 billion versus the
$4 billion that was actually disbursed.26
income replacement?

Why not full

Are not the worker and their family

entitled to live as though the worker "had remained well and
sound?"27

A proposal has already been mentioned which would

allow a doubling of benefits at no added expense.

But this

might compete with the goal of industrial efficiency,

as

construed by industry as output per dollar expended.

It has

long been feared that "as the proportion of wages replaced
is increased, the worker will have less incentive to return
to work."28

This would contribute to lost productivity and

increased costs.

As Ashford points out,

the conflict

between efficiency and income maintenance is a real one, but
one which could be subject to empirical resolution through a
study of return to work in relation to comp payments.
has yet to be done.

The real lesson here

additional conflicts enumerated elsewhere)
inconsistency in the goals of programs,

This

(as with the
is that internal

such as worker's
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lead to political struggles in which "the relative

power of private interests may determine the outcome."29
Perhaps the core inconsistency lies in the goal of
insurance coverage.

As already described,

the initial

intent was to insure workers against a decline in income
secondary to injury and to protect industry from crippling
liability judgments.

But the type of insurance that was

created is far better suited to the latter as it "treats the
wastage of man-power as it does the wearing out of machi¬
nery."30

It is logical of this compensation system then to

allow industry to pass on the costs of compensation to the
consumer much as they would depreciate their equipment.
Schneider stated in 1922 that:
The plain purpose of the compensation law is to
make the risk of accident one of the industry
itself, to follow from the fact of injury, and
hence that compensation on account thereof should
be treated as an element in the cost of produc¬
tion, added to the cost of the article and borne
by the community in general.31
This fact,

combined with a number of realities which

insulate employers from the true costs of injury and
illness, make compensation much less effective than it might
be at promoting prevention.

This is taken up again in

Chapter six.
Returning to worker's compensation and occupational
disease,

it is important to recognize how uncomfortably the

comp system has accommodated the inclusion of disease.

In

contrast to accidents, which are discrete temporal events
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with clear and often dramatic causal connection to any
injury, disease is often slow to develop,

difficult to

distinguish from nonoccupational illnesses and the conse¬
quence of multiple causal factors.

A classic illustration

is lung cancer, which can develop 25 to 35 years after even
brief exposure and which presents essentially in the same
manner as Tobacco induced lung cancers.

Furthermore,

it is

known that cigarette smoking increases the risk of lung
cancer and other lung diseases in exposed workers.

The

Uretek hepatitis cases are also illustrative although
unusual in their short latency period.

Workers frequently

run up against statutes of limitations for filing compensa¬
tion claims.

The U.S.

Department of Labor recommends a one

year limit after the victim becomes aware of an illness and
that the illness is work-related.

In 1972 only 26 of 58

worker's compensation statutes met this standard.32

The

problem is further compounded if the worker has moved on to
one or more employers or retired in the intervening years.
This is the rule rather than the exception with occupational
lung disease and cancer.
vulnerable,

Retired workers are particularly

as the comp system requires the claimant to be

in the workforce to be eligible for payments.
Multiple and uncertain etiologies also present problems
for a system which treats disease as a special sort of
injury.

For one,

it has left the insurance carrier with an

easily abused basis for contesting claims as it is quite

.
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difficult to achieve the same level of certainty in
assigning cause in the case of disease as opposed to injury.
This situation exists because the comp law takes an overly
simplistic view of causation, treating it as a question
amenable to swift resolution by one or more "experts".
While this might be true of injuries that result from
accidents,
disease.

it is decidedly unproductive in the case of
The philosophical roots of this approach to

problems are explored further in the section on obstacles to
reform,

in chapter six.

For the moment,

the point is that

multiple causation introduces an element of irreducible
uncertainty, beyond what is encountered in a workplace
accident.
hearings

This makes for long and acrimonious compensation
(eg the Uretek hearings still in progress a full

year after the outbreak),

or worse, workers being denied

compensation.
Although the response to workplace disease is not the
central issue of this thesis,

it is important to understand

the very complex system that is worker's compensation.
fact,

In

it is impossible to analyze prevention and recognition

without such an understanding.

By looking at the develop¬

ment of worker's comp legislation historically certain
patterns become clear.
abdicated its role,

In many states Government has

and in so doing, placed a heavy burden

for injury and illness on workers and their families.

A

nation-wide study of 2.2 million workers disabled for at
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least three months found only 24.7% ever receive compensa¬
tion.

68.5% never even bothered to apply and this appears

to be because they did not expect to get anything.

Less

than 1% of all compensation payments before OSHA were for
occupational disease,
number was 1.35%.33

and four years after the OSH act,

the

All of this suggests a huge reservoir

of uncompensated victims.

Why is this so?

The reasons are

similar to those for the delay in recognition of the Uretek
cases.

Workers who got sick were fired and not eligible for

compensation.

Moreover,

the cause and effect relationship

of work and illness are clear neither to the employee nor
the physician.

As with Uretek,

it can be a long time,

and

many sick workers, before this concordance is established.
Particularly worrisome in this regard is the vast and
rapidly increasing stock of chemicals to which workers are
exposed, many incompletely tested for toxicity,

and the time

lag for appearance of information about their hazards.
Perhaps the clearest,
familiar pattern,

and unfortunately the most

is the ability of large companies to set

societal priorities when legislation fails to resolve
conflicting interests of workers and business.

The next

section will examine the development of occupational
surveillance in Connecticut from the same historical
perspective.
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State Health & Safety Programs
For a number of reasons, most of the early activities in
occupational health occurred at the state level.

For one,

the response to workplace tragedies was most intense on a
local level.

The most famous of these disasters was the

Triangle shirt-waist factory fire of 1911 in which 146 women
died in a Greenwich Village factory.

Many burned to death,

unable to escape through blocked exits,

others jumped eight

stories to their death rather than be incinerated.

It is

worth noting that some recognition had been brought to
working conditions in the garment industry just the year
before the fire by a massive strike.

Labor activism of this

type was another source of pressure on the local level, but
not nationally,

as the unions were insufficiently powerful

to generate federal activity in the 1920's.

Even local

influence was restricted to areas like New York with its
relatively strong unions.
strike,

In the case of the garment

the result was a city sanitary authority, which in

any event did not avert the Triangle disaster.

In a pattern

which repeats itself throughout the history of workplace
disasters,

a committee was formed after the Triangle fire

"to meet the public protest",

in the words of New York State

Senator Alfred Smith.34
In reviewing the historical record for significant
disasters and outbreaks, two important facts emerge.
far fewer accidents have become part of the historical

First,
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record than one might expect given the documented conditions
in factories of the day.

In the case of the Triangle fire,

a UPI reporter happened to be strolling through Washington
Square as the flames ignited and proceeded to phone live
reports to the telegraph office as the tragedy unfolded.
Few accidents benefit from such exposure,
smaller,

especially

less dramatic ones that occur far from Midtown

Manhattan.

Furthermore,

diseases lack entirely this sort

of immediacy, upon which the media thrives.

A case in point

is the Gauley Bridge, West Virginia outbreak of the early
1930's,

in which more than 700 tunnel miners died of acute

silicosis,

dwarfing the better known mining and factory

accidents of the era and yet almost completely unknown
today,

even among labor historians.

reasons why Gauley Bridge

There are a number of

may have fallen into obscurity,

including a concerted effort to destroy records by the
company, Union Carbide.
question, however,

It does at least raise the

of how the media and scholars react to an

epidemic of workplace disease as opposed to an accident.
Certainly,

an outbreak of a newly recognized disease,

the case at Gauley Bridge and at Uretek,

as was

offers greater

"plausible deniability" for an employer than a fire or
accident.

In the Gauley Bridge case the employer. Union

Carbide, virtually escaped both public censure and sig¬
nificant financial responsibility.35

The Triangle fire is

unusual in that it did have an indirect effect on other
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states, perhaps because the drama and immediacy captured the
media's attention.

The Connecticut Experience
Within two years of the Triangle fire three states. New
York,

Connecticut and Ohio,

inspection.

organized programs in factory

Massachusetts had an early lead in this area

with "power of closure" authority for grave hazards accorded
to factory inspectors in 1852.36

By 1890,

14 states had

statutes providing authority for factory and workshop
inspectors.

In most cases, however,

these laws were window

dressing as inspectors were political appointees and
unlikely to ruffle business feathers.
recognize safety hazards,

Few were trained to

and expertise in disease preven¬

tion was almost non-existent.
The history in Connecticut was typical.

Factory

inspectors were appointed by the Governor, with consent of
the Senate.

Their responsibilities were as follows:

He shall examine all buildings where machinery is
used and report to the Governor as respects safety
to life and health of such places.
Shall see that
factories are properly lighted, ventilated and
clean.
Shall have the power to require provisions
(sic) of toilet rooms with the state Board of
Health.
Shall cause excessive dust to be removed.
Shall inspect houses where certain forms of work
are conducted and shall order them to be kept
clean and sanitary condition, well lighted and
ventilated.37

History

82

The authority to require restrooms is a bit more cir¬
cumscribed than the power of closure enjoyed by Massachu¬
setts inspectors.

Moreover,

responsibility for factory

conditions was divided among factory inspectors,

local and

county health officers, the tuberculosis commission and the
bureau of labor statistics.38

Though data on disease and

accident rates in Connecticut at the time is not available,
a newspaper story stated that accidental deaths dropped by
4000 per year from 1915 to 1922 suggesting a far from
trivial rate of mortality and presumably morbidity.39

This

situation obtained until 1922 and the arrival of a new
commissioner of Health from Massachusetts,
Osborn.

Dr Osborn,

Dr Stanley H.

a graduate of Tufts Medical School in

1914, had served for three years as state epidemiologist
before his appointment as Deputy Commissioner of Health in
1920.

Promoted to commissioner in 1922,

he lost little time

in expanding the role of the department of health in
industrial hygiene.

Up to that point the department's role

in workplace protection was primarily imaginary.
in 1878,

Organized

the state board could make investigations and issue

reports on almost any subject affecting public health and
safety but had no authority to remedy any condition
discovered by its investigations.40

Recognizing that

incidence data was required to direct investigations,

Osborn

had the reporting statute of 1921 revised to allow reports
of workplace disease to come to the department of health

,

■
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instead of to the commissioner of factory inspection.41

The

statute already required any physician or patient who
believed they were treating or suffering from a disease
"contracted as a result of the nature of... employment" to
contact the department of health within 48 hours.
often the law was observed,

and by whom is not known though

it did provide both for a fee to Physicians
fine

(10 dollars)

Just how

for failure to report.

(50 cents)

and a

Writing in 1928,

the physician who ultimately took responsibility for
occupational health in Connecticut commented:
No appropriation was provided at that time,
however, with which to secure the observation of
this statute, so that like another I need not
mention, it was honored more by its breach than by
its observance and occupational disease reports
were fragmentary to say the least.42
Irrespective of the actual number,

the reports made pursuant

to this law served Dr. Osborn when he returned to the
legislature in 1927 to request a full-time physician for the
study of occupational disease.

Osborn was successful in

persuading the legislature to appropriate funds to "inves¬
tigate and make recommendations for the elimination or
prevention of occupational diseases".

The debate which

occurred about the bill is interesting if only for its
similarity to some of the statements made during the Uretek
incident.
In the discussion,

a legislator asserted that "98% of

the accidents are due to the carelessness of the operator."
Osborn responded appropriately

that it depended on the type

-

"
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of injury:
men."43

"Anthra

(sic)

is not due to the carelessness of

Osborn goes on to say,

treat disease.

"we are not asking money to

What we are asking is money for the

prevention of disease."

A month later,

Health and Safety Committee,

Dr.

having persuaded the

Osborn encountered stiffer

resistance amongst Appropriations committee members.
Republican Senator Edward F.

Hall maintained that all

occupational health problems were those of "proper machi¬
nery., and the personal habits and home conditions of the
worker."44

Consistent with this view,

Senator Hall opposed

the appropriation on the grounds that "the employees should
solve

[it]

themselves."45

The views of the Senator are not

surprising given that many were factory owners,
they particularly original.

nor were

What is notable about the

session is the articulate and impassioned defense of the
proposal by two representatives of the Connecticut Manufac¬
turers'

Association.

fully appreciated,

Making a point which is still to be

a Mr Walsh stated that:

all disease is an economic loss to the people
concerned and to the state.
The state through its
sanatoria is today taking care of a good many
cases probably of occupational diseases.
It is
possible by making a careful study of disease to
very much limit it.
As you all know that is the
way we have eliminated diseases.46
His colleague Mr Smith added that "if $17,500 did nothing
but solve that one condition in Danbury,
more than pay for itself."
clinic,

I think it would

Given the experience of the Yale

and statements in the press by industry,

these would
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be enlightened views on their part even by contemporary
standards.

They are certainly atypical

for the time and

raise the issue of whether they owe more to personal
allegiance to Dr Osborn than to forward thinking.
unfortunately no record of how the manufacturers'
tion arrived at its position.

There is
associa¬

In the annual report of the

association for 1927 there is a suggestion that concerns
about limiting compensation claims played a part.
While the health department is not concerned in
the worker's compensation aspect of this question,
one effect of the work contemplated by the
department will doubtless be a diminution of
occupational disease claims47
If indeed this was the principal
is a curious one.

reason for their support it

It was perhaps not evident in those early

years of worker's compensation that insurance premiums would
not closely follow the history of claims at a particular
plant.

Although other influences may have played a role in

this case,

it may represent anecdotal evidence that premiums

truly tied to costs might induce employers to take an
interest in preventive measures.
included in the final chapter.

Just such a proposal
At any rate,

passed over the objections of several

is

the proposal

legislators,

and the

sum of $17,500 dollars was appropriated.
Dr Osborn used the funds to hire Dr Alfred S.

Gray as

director of the newly created division of occupational
diseases.

It was the first state to create an agency

charged solely with the elucidation of workplace disease and
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it went far beyond the "safety first" atmosphere of the day.
It was,

however,

consistent with the philosophy of employer

beneficence prevalent at the time.

The approach of the

department was that of cooperation with industry,
assumption that once brought to its attention,

with the

industries

would correct hazards as a matter of "good business".

They

had the power to inspect and recommend but there were no
provisions for enforcement.
The department is empowered to make investigations
of any condition reported to it or suspected of
causing occupational disease, and the result of
its investigation cannot be used in court
compensation cases.48
There is evidence that in cases of imminent threat to life
the health department could shut down a workplace,

but this

occurred rarely if ever.49

The work of the department rapidly expanded,

and there

is evidence that it was effective even without punitive
powers.

In 1928 an engineer trained in industrial hygiene

and laboratory technique was added and a laboratory was
opened.

The first year there were a

inquiries.
information,
visits.

"dozen or two"

By 1935 the number had grown to 463
thirty-two technical

requests for

studies and 148

According to a report by Dr Gray,

site

the work of the

department "resulted in definite improvement in working
conditions,
and,

changes in processes,

in a number of instances,

substitution of materials,

the purchase of entirely new

..
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not as the result of mandatory orders but because

of the fact that these industries were given definite
concrete information on the effects of the environment on
health."50

Major studies included mercurialism in the hat

industry and lead toxicity.

The hat industry study led in

1941 to a ban on the use of Mercury to "cure" fur felt,
particularly important as 50% of the hat industry was based
in Connecticut.

Many other states followed Connecticut's

lead with a mercury ban of their own.
As it did throughout the U.S.,

the Second World War

expanded interest and all important funding to occupational
health in order to achieve peak production efficiency.
bureau of industrial hygiene,

as it was then called,

expanded to 28 employees including physicians,
chemists,

The

nurses,

and industrial hygienists/engineers.51

This may

have been the largest industrial disease operation in the
country.

Prior to the war,

Connecticut already had the

largest staff and budget per number of industrial workers of
any state.52

It was undoubtedly this unparalleled level of

funding which allowed the bureau to pursue vigorous
workplace surveillance.

A 1940 annual report tallies 25

studies of potential hazards,

367 site visits,

investigation

of 455 cases of disease and the receipt of 1066 requests for
information.
There were several unique aspects to the work of the
bureau at that time,

in addition to its size and high level

'
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Most significant was the presence of physi¬

cians who carried out real and informed evaluations of
workplace health.

In the words of Dr Osborn,

the duty of

the physician was "to appraise the health of the workers in
terms of exposure to toxic substances... and to assist in the
early recognition and the prevention of occupational
disease.53

It is precisely this type of surveillance that

is entirely lacking in the current system and is one of the
prime weaknesses which allowed the Uretek outbreak to occur.
The other significant activity of the bureau in the
postwar period was the regular inspection of Connecticut
workplaces.

Unlike the current system whereby OSHA only

inspects by management or labor request,

a team including a

physician might inspect on the basis of reports of occupa¬
tional disease gleaned from compensation records,
health department files,
inspections.

company

and state department of labor

In addition,

routine industrial hygiene surveys [were]
conducted periodically by chemists or engi¬
neers... The interval between surveys determined by
the hazards associated with the manufacturing
processes.
New plants, or changes in techniques
and processes of old plants, require[d] immediate
investigation.54
This almost certainly suggests a level of surveillance of
industry in the state which has not been matched to date.
Dr Wistar Meigs,

former director of the Yale Institute of

Occupational Medicine

(1947-70)55,

recalls that the state

bureau was managing to visit registered workplaces at least

.
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every two years.

Dr Osborn did not note whether these

visits were surprise or announced,
persisted.

nor for how long they

He did record a large variety of investigations

including airborne and biological monitoring
lead in brass, battery,

(urine)

for

and metallurgical industries,

chlorinated hydrocarbons in degreasing and solvent reclama¬
tion operations, toluol in rubber manufacture and spray
painting.

A study of Para-Nitro-Phenol measurement in

urine and blood cholinesterase activity in workers exposed
to parathion,

an insecticide,

is sufficiently sophisticated

to have been taken from the pages of a 1980's journal.

What

perhaps had begun as a naive but well-meaning agency had
become a very sophisticated occupational health program.
Boundaries were drawn quite broadly on the bureau's
scope.

Dr Osborn wrote of the "necessity of considering

mental health as part of an occupational disease program"
and cites poor housing and recreation facilities,
tious and routine work,

repeti¬

and dependence on others for

economic security as reasons for this need.

He placed a

priority on abatement of noise and heat and hired an
audiometrician for screening purposes.

He promoted the

distribution of educational material on family and community
health including brochures on cancer,
industry,

nutrition, women in

child care, venereal disease,

mental hygiene.

tuberculosis,

A clinic was established to evaluate

workers with abnormal heart rhythms and the department

and

.
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contemplated providing a dentist to visit plants.

Dr Osborn

persuaded eight small Hartford factories to pool resources
and hire a full-time experienced industrial physician.
According to Dr Osborn, the plan in its sixth year of
operation in 1952 "has worked out to the satisfaction of
labor and management and has paid for itself in savings."56
To this roseate view of the department,

and acknowledging

the radical nature of the approach just detailed,

it is

crucial to add that no objective data exists as to how well
the bureau detected workplace hazards and whether they were
appropriately abated.

A UAW official complained at 1973

hearings that no fines or legal action were ever insti¬
tuted.57
field,

However,

at least within the industrial hygiene

the state's program was well-respected.

Dr Osborn

chaired the industrial hygiene committee of the Conference
of State Health Authorities of 1928 to at least 1940,

and

the state's chief industrial hygienist chaired the American
Conference of Hygienists for a number of years.
The decline of the program in the 1950's suggests that
not everyone appreciated their efforts.

As is sometimes the

case, the decline is less well documented than the ascendan¬
cy.

Dr Meigs recalls that Dr Gray retired in the 1950's and

that Ken Marckasson,

an industrial engineer who replaced

him, was much less persuasive with the legislature, perhaps
because he was not an MD.

Dr Osborn retired as Commissioner

of Health in 1959 after 37 years,

earning him the title of

.
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"dean" of health commissioners.58

Almost certainly the

growth of the state department of industrial hygiene was due
to the duration and intensity of commitment and the respect
he commanded among legislators.
Even before Osborn's retirement,

the department had

begun to shrink slowly from attrition,

a trend justified by

legislators on grounds that they had done such a thorough
job,

occupational disease was rapidly waning.

John Geil,

According to

appointed chief industrial hygienist in 1967,

the

department had dwindled at that point to five industrial
hygienists and a ventilation engineer under the direction of
Joseph Staper,

a physician.

The history of occupational health in Connecticut is of
a cyclic waxing and waning of attention and effort, while
almost every other area of equivalent importance in medicine
experienced exponential growth.

The first surge of activity

in the 1920's is followed by a levelling off in the 1930's,
and then an explosion of activity during and immediately
after World War II,

again followed by a diminution of effort

in the late 1950's and 1960's,
than in the 30's.

this time more pronounced

Certainly the end of the New Deal and the

crest of anti-labor sentiment accompanying McCarthyism
played a role in the late 50's in decreasing the popularity
of occupational health.

Curiously,

the prosperity and

social unrest in the 1960's did not translate into improved
worker health,

at least not quickly,

perhaps because of a
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dilution of energy that accompanied the push for other
health legislation such as Medicare and Medicaid.

While the

passage of the OSHA act in 1970 clearly presaged vast
improvement in occupational health in most states,
seen as another phase in the cycle of oscillations,
least in Connecticut,

it can be
and,

at

not necessarily the peak of an upward

spiral of progress when compared with the postwar bureau.

OSHA & the State:

By Whom?

For Whom?

The changes in state occupational health accompanying
OSHA are confusing but not terribly important in the end.
The decline of the bureau of industrial hygiene had occurred
years before and although with a staff of six it may have
been more effective than OSHA is today,

it was hardly the

groundbreaking effort it had been at its peak.

After a

brief experiment with a true focus on occupational health
and prevention,

the pendulum had again returned to the

safety quarter.
After years of floundering under the fragmentary
authority of the Walsh-Healey Act which established
standards for and authorized inspection of government
contractors, the Federal Government finally promulgated
national legislation in 1970.

The process had begun

officially in 1966 at the behest of President Johnson.
precise historical factors which motivated the president

The
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have not been extensively studied to date,

and such an

undertaking is beyond the scope of this paper.

Certainly,

the environmental movement's politicization of the effects
of pollution and the concerns it raised about chemicals did
much to break the trail and focus concern on the workplace.
In any event, the departments of Labor and HEW both began
development of a federal program and quickly became
ensnarled in a 2-year bureaucratic tug-of-war over who would
ultimately be in control of the new agency.

Bold maneuver¬

ing by the Secretary of Labor persuaded the Bureau of Budget
and the president to accept the labor proposal and Johnson
called on Congress to pass enabling legislation in 1968.
The legislation stalled, due in part to vigorous opposition
by business in the form of the Chamber of Commerce.
have seen before OSHA,

As we

a disaster and the outrage which

ensues is often required to overcome opposition to occupa¬
tional health legislation.

In 1968,

76 workers died in an

explosion at the Farmington Mine in West Virginia.
responded in 1969 with the Mine Safety Act,

and in 1970,

answering the hue and cry of both public and labor,
Occupational Safety and Health Act.

the

A further analysis of

OSHA beyond that here and in Chapters 2 & 3 is,
ly,

Congress

unfortunate¬

not within the limits of this project.59
For the sake of completeness,

the events in the state

in the early 1970's as a consequence of the OSH Act will be
briefly discussed.

The federal OSHA legislation passed in
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1970 encouraged states to develop their own programs,

provided they were at least as stringent as the federal act,
and,

as an inducement, offered to provide 50% of the annual

costs.

At that time responsibility was divided in Connec¬

ticut, with the Health Department responsible for workplace
health,

and the Department of Labor,

looking after safety.

and its inspectors,

From 1971 to 1973,

Federal OSHA

existed side by side with the aforementioned state struc¬
tures and developed a reputation for action,
comparatively.

at least

Connecticut was one of the first states to

file with the federal government for approval of a state
plan and in February 1973, public hearings were held for
comment on the proposal.

The plan had been developed by

the Department of Labor without input from the Department of
Health or Dr Staper.

By and large the opposing testimony

was very well thought out and researched.

The opposition

included organized labor, citizens' groups,
faculty of Yale law and medical schools.

and students and

Many of the most

incisive critiques cut to the flaws of federal OSHA as most
of the state plan was lifted verbatim from the federal
statute.

However,

the principal concern of many opponents

was that state supervision,
Health, would be inadequate.

especially by the Department of
Mr Michael Kane,

representing

the now defunct New Haven Citizens' Action Committee,
stated:
The testimony and experience of the Unions that we
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have been in touch with have shown the inadequacy
of state enforcement, particularly by the
Department of Health.
As an example, in 18 years
the Connecticut Health Department...has referred
exactly one case...to the state Attorney General's
office for possible prosecution...In contrast, the
Federal OSHA office for this region, although it
is understaffed, has compiled a relatively
impressive record of protection of worker health
within the limits of federal law.60
Kane also pointed out that in 1968 Connecticut fielded 37
fish-and-game wardens

(in a state not renowned for its

hunting and fishing),

and the same number of state workplace

inspectors.

Kane's views were echoed by representatives of

Labor at the meeting.
state in 1988,

With two OSHA inspectors covering the

a return to even the 1968 level, viewed by

Kane as woefully inadequate, would be welcome.

Kane went

on to say that much of the mistrust of the state centered on
a feeling that they would back away from large employers who
were fighting OSHA in court at the time
Technologies).
could not,

(e.g. United

The decline of OSHA under President Reagan

of course, be foreseen in 1973,

that in the wake of Uretek,

but it is ironic

Connecticut unions have called

for a return to state authority.
Another set of concerns about the state plan,

especial¬

ly relevant to the Uretek case, was raised by the Yale Lung
Research Center.

Speaking for the group, Janet Schoenberg,

a public health student,

described three major areas of

concern about the state plan that apply equally to federal
OSHA.

Noting that much emphasis had been placed on safety

problems in industry,

Schoenberg highlighted that the

■

■
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"magnitude of industrial health problems is grossly
underestimated".61

The group recommended that safety

inspectors be trained in rudimentary hygiene technique so
that they might notice health hazards.
be a welcome addition to federal OSHA,

Certainly this would
as well as possibly

averting the necessity of separate health and safety
investigations that led to the ignored safety report on
Uretek in February 1979,

and the needless continuation of

the hazard for seven additional years.

Schoenberg also took

issue with the state's proposed five-year inspection
interval,

describing it as "totally inadequate" given the

seriousness of certain health hazards and the frequency of
changes in industrial processes.62

Again,

it is difficult

to find words to describe the degree to which workers are at
risk in the current system,

with inspections much less

frequent than every five years on average.

The final

recommendation of interest was that medical

surveillance be

an explicit part of the act.

As we have discussed,

this is

one of the major failings of the OSH Act as well and a
recommendation which will be reiterated in Chapter six.

The

other testimony against the state plan had to do with
promulgation of standards,
commission,

composition of the review

and other points more germane to a discussion of

the federal OSH Act.

The testimony in support of the state

plan came from the Manufacturers'
and Industry Association,

Association,

and small

the Business

factory owners,

all of
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it resting on the basic premise that state and local
supervision is better than federal oversight.

One final

point concerning the hearing worth noting is the prophetic
testimony of Leonard Dube of the Connecticut UAW.

Mr Dube

made the following statement to the state panel:
Between the citation appeal system, the pos¬
sibility of long abatement periods, and the
variance system, the clever employer can keep a
modern day sweat shop humming for literally years
before he feels the minor pinch of an insig¬
nificant civil fine, or, at the worst, a suspended
criminal sentence.6-*
This is basically a description of the way Uretek conducted
itself in regard to its DEP and its OSHA violations,
some would say,

with the predicted outcome.

many flaws identified in the state bill,

and as

In spite of the

the Labor committee

reported it favorably to the General Assembly.
The bill went rather rapidly to the House
in May to the Senate,

where it was passed.

considerable amount of acrimonious debate,

in April,

and

There was a
some of it

reflecting insufficient time to consider such a complex
piece of legislation.

Those in favor of the bill,

primarily

Republicans who held majorities in both chambers at the
time,

argued that it provided for two groups of employees

not covered by the federal act - those of municipalities and
the state,

which was true.

Another argument offered in

favor was that the state plan would lighten the onerous
burden of federal stipulations on Connecticut industry and
avert imminent shutdowns and layoffs.

The hyperbole

'
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involved in this position was evident to the opposition at
the time,

and certainly to any contemporary reader,

but the

Democrats did not succeed in defeating or amending the bill.
A final point,

and perhaps the most important,

is that

supporters estimated that the state would receive $350,000
during the first year of implementation.
seen as a way to obtain federal
with the sweetener that,

So the act was

funding for a state agency

if necessary,

they could double the

size of the department at no cost to the state
45 state inspectors at the time,

including only 7 qualified

to inspect for workplace health violations,
members

for the region).

(there were

and 8 OSHA staff

It was the prospect of a large

grant from Washington toward a program for which Connecticut
was already paying that ultimately swayed the legislators.
In 1977,

after four years of experience with the state-

administered program,

the General Assembly reversed itself

and returned full authority to the

federal government,

except for state and municipal employees who are not covered
by the OSHA legislation.
were of duplication,
most of all,

Complaints with the state plan

of poor quality of inspections,

of unnecessary expenditure.

state's 50% share,

some $311,000,

with a tightened fiscal climate,

Suddenly the

seemed too much to pay
and opponents of the

original bill were able to reverse the 1973
surprisingly,

and,

action.

Not

the state agency with its hobbled medical

branch had dealt poorly with health hazards and had been
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embarrassed by surprise OSHA visits to plants such as
Groton's Electric Boat shipyard,
health violations.
showed that 96.3
and only 3.7%

which uncovered willful

A federal review of state performance

% of inspections were in the safety area

in the health area

in one six month period.

Even former supporters of the state plan recanted.

As one

legislator put it:
Connecticut OSHA can respond well within a very
limited area of capability, maybe retail stores,
maybe beyond that, but in terms of the industrial
sector, they have not been doing the job.
And I
say this as someone who voted for putting OSHA
under Connecticut in 1973.64
Though the better informed individuals were skeptical of
federal OSHA's abilities as well,

there was a climate of

renewed optimism with President Carter's appointment of Eula
Bingham as OSHA's head.

As Uretek has so amply proven,

the

promise of decent workplace conditions made by the OSH Act
is yet to be realized.

The next chapter will

look at

obstacles to creating a healthy workplace highlighted by the
Uretek case and how they might be surmounted.
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CHAPTER SIX:

PROGNOSES AND PRESCRIPTIONS

The drama of the Uretek story has done much to
publicize the plight of workers'
However,

in its tendency to simplify,

historical context,
story.

health in the media.

Yes,

and its disregard for

the reporters told only part of the

OSHA had been ravaged by budget cuts and this

in part accounted for the lugubriousness and seeming
disinterest OSHA displayed in the Uretek case.

But the

media missed the fact that OSHA has little capacity to
assess workplace health.

Moreover,

the fact that the state

Health Department had very successfully incorporated just
those functions in the 1930's and 40's went completely
unrecognized.

As Cullen has pointed out,

neither the first,

nor the worst case,

disease stemming from the workplace.1

"uretek was

of life-threatening
Of the more than

2,000 cases of Occupational disease seen by the Yale clinic
since 1979,

more than a few have been fatal and most did not

occur in facilities described as

"Dickensian".

This final

chapter is a synthesis of a deeper analysis of the Uretek
outbreak.
missed,

It provides some subtler reasons why Uretek was

what is needed to prevent future Ureteks,

and some

larger societal obstacles which need to be overcome.
remarks:

Cullen

.

106

Prognoses
If that awareness [of Uretek] could be transformed
into a deeper understanding of what transpired and
why it will continue to happen until people demand
a change, perhaps something worthwhile may yet be
accomplished.2
It is in this spirit that this chapter is proffered.

Recognizing Workplace Disease:
Why Uretek Was Missed
Thus

far the focus has been on the bureaucratic

deficiencies of OSHA:
enforcement,

lack of funding,

and scarcity of standards.

lack of health
OSHA's

failings can

not be blamed solely on a failure of political will,
however.
tional

There are a number of characteristics of occupa¬

illness that make it so difficult to recognize and

are in part responsible for OSHA'S

inadequacy.

Foremost are three aspects of occupational disease
alluded to in earlier chapters.

First,

occupational

disease is difficult to distinguish from nonoccupational
disease.
history,

Rarely is there any sign,

aside form the work

which provides a clue to the etiology.

two elements,

multifactorial causation and long latency,

were already mentioned in regard to the workers'
tion system.

compensa¬

These two together make it difficult to

establish the cause of workplace illnesses.
case,

The other

In the Uretek

liver injury was a nonspecific response to chemicals;

viruses and alcohol & drug abuse had to be excluded.
case of asbestos related lung disease,

In the

on the other hand,

cigarette smoke has been shown to be a synergist with

’

.

.
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asbestos fibers in the production of lung carcinomas and
must be factored into attributions of causation.

These

examples are provided to show that it is often easy to
dismiss a workplace disease as due to some agent outside the
workplace,

and this tendency affects physicians and workers

alike.
Another issue hindering the prompt recognition of
workplace morbidity,

especially notable at Uretek,

limited data on chemicals.

is

There are between 250 and

500,000 substances in use in US

factories,

and OSHA has

exposure limits for about 500 of the total number.

Part of

the problem has been that the rapid proliferation of new
substances has run far ahead of research on their toxic
effects.

In a few cases this already worrisome situation

has been worsened by misrepresentation on the part of
chemical manufacturers.

The net result is that workers way

be legally exposed to high levels of chemicals

for which the

health effects are not known.
Disincentives to report also impede recognition of onthe-job illness.

Workers may be ignorant of the hazards,

like the Uretek workers,and thus be unable to diagnose their
own malady.

Even a worker who feels he is sick because of

his job may be ignored by his employer,
being fired,
OSHA.

at worst,

or risk

if he or she takes the concern to

Although the OSH act provides

those who make reports,

at best,

for the anonymity of

the instigator may be obvious

in a
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small shop.

Less obvious is that fact that some workers may

hesitate to report because they fear elimination of their
job,
less.

or that they might be transferred to one that pays
("Dirty jobs" often provide "hazard pay".)

employer side,

On the

there is the somewhat misplaced fear that

reporting of illness in their workplace may bring OSHA
inspections,
premiums.

fines,

and higher compensation insurance

All of these factors tend to keep workplace

disease a silent epidemic.
One final point,
underemphasized.

though left to last,

That is,

is not to be

the abysmal state of medical

training in occupational medicine.

Yale's curriculum

includes just one hour in four years and the situation is
similar,

or worse at other institutions.

Fewer than one

third of all medical curricula include any required
coursework3

and little postgraduate exposure occurs

in

internal medicine or family practice residency training.4
The consequence of this is that few physicians collect an
occupational history or know what patterns to look for.
Cullen has succinctly maintained:
Inability to recognize symptoms and signs of
illness as related to work exposures precludes
useful clinical intervention: opportunity for
disease modification and possible prevention of
disease in others is simply lost.5
It is to the topic of prevention that we now turn.

As

’
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Preventing Workplace Disease:
No More Ureteks
The threat of an OSHA inspection has been useful in
motivating changes suggested by the Yale clinic in some
workplaces,

and OSHA itself has prompted abatement of

hazards in others.

As we have seen, however, this is not

by itself adeguate to protect worker health.

The need for a

separate surveillance system has been implied throughout the
discussion of the Uretek case.
The debate in Connecticut,

and other states,

over

whether the state or the federal government should run such
a system is really a mirage.
agency is needed.

The real issue is what sort of

Cullen and others have proposed that a

true federal occupational health agency be created and
staffed by physicians,

epidemiologists,

and toxicologists:

The bottom line is that a strong OSHA needs a
strong, empowered companion, a health agency that
evaluates
, as OSHA evaluates machines and
chemicals.D
Such an agency will need appropriate legal authority to
compel intransigent employers to cooperate.

It will need

funding adequate to provide for inspection and for encourag¬
ing the training of professionals and education of workers
in occupational health and risks of the workplace.

It will

probably want to implement exposure limits which involve
biological
tests,

etc)

(eg blood, urine,

chest x-ray, pulmonary function

monitoring as opposed to only airborne monitor¬

ing as done by OSHA.

Biological monitoring is currently
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only in use for workers exposed to lead,
cotton dust.

workers,

coal,

and

This type of oversight would allow for better

estimation of actual exposure,
absorption,

asbestos,

especially by dermal

and stricter enforcement of standards.

for example,

Lead

who are found to have blood levels

above the legal limit on periodic checks,
the levels fall below the safety limit,
receive full pay during any furlough.

cannot work until

and continue to
The incentive is

clearly very strong in those workplaces to attend to worker
health.

The same effect could be reinforced if workers'

compensation insurance rates began to reflect the actual
costs and performance of a given workplace.

We have

reviewed the point that only a fifth of the income losses
from injuries are recouped by workers,

and then only by the

minority who apply for compensation.7

Since disease

represents only 1-2% of all compensation claims

it makes

sense to assume that very little of the actual costs are
being reflected in premium rates.

The bottom line is that

an equitable system should account for who benefits and who
bears risks,
former,

and to place the costs of disease on the

not the latter.8

Perhaps most important to the success of any agency
charged with protection of worker health will be reliable
information concerning the incidence of disease.

It is a

truism that what is not yet discovered can not be altered.
In order for occupational health to receive funding

*
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commensurate with its importance,
once such monies are allocated,
collected.

and to direct its focus

reliable statistics must be

The current state of affairs is so dire that

there is disagreement about information as basic as the
number of people who die at work in America.

This is

estimated to be 100,000 individuals but even this is a rough
approximation.

A recent study commissioned by the National

Research Council excoriated the current system,

especially

the recent moves toward voluntary reporting,

and made

extensive recommendations for improvement.9

This data will

not only direct enforcement activity but also badly needed
clinical research on the health effects of workplace
hazards.

This would include the natural history of

occupational diseases; the spectrum of signs,

symptoms,

and

laboratory findings in a specific disorder; comparisons of
alternative strategies for diagnosis and treatment;
development of early predictors; and assessment of the
psychological and social impact of interventions requiring
changes in a person's work.10

Larger Issues:
The Ruling Paradigm
This review of the Uretek outbreak has revealed a
number of themes or paradigms which undergird thinking in
our society and which will stand in the way of the sorts of
improvements just suggested.

.
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The first is a "crisis orientation" not shared by other
countries to the same degree.

Progress in occupational

health has either followed workplace disasters or been at
the behest of business demands.

There has been little in

the way of preventive thinking.

The same pattern can be

seen in our parochial devotion to petroleum in a world soon
to run out, to our production of nuclear and toxic waste
with no safe place to put it,

and in the health arena,

to

the sudden attention to "national" medical insurance when it
has become too expensive for businesses to insure their
employees.
A corollary to the crisis orientation is methodological
individualism; the reduction of societal and systemic
problems to the individual level.

In workplace safety,

focus is on the "accident-prone" worker.

the

With unemployment,

the problem is individuals too lazy to look at the want ads.
With rape it is the provocatively dressed woman.
homelessness it is disdain for living indoors.
poverty,

a lack of drive and initiative.

With
With

Thus it is a

logical extension to view Uretek as the result of alcohol
and tylenol abuse.

One of the things that allows this

asystemic approach to exist is the ahistorical character of
American news coverage,
reporting.

amply exemplified in the Uretek

While it is true that "newness" is newsworthi¬

ness the world over, American news coverage, with its
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penchant for images and "bites",

is particularly extreme in

its slavishness to the "new".
Another dominant paradigm in government has been the
use of economic criteria in decisionmaking.

The view of the

current administration has been to regulate only in
instances of "market failure",
benefit analysis.

and then,

only after a cost-

There are several problems with this

model when applied to workplace health.

"Market failure" is

practically guaranteed by "inadequate information,

lack of

labor mobility, unequal bargaining power,

and presence of

externalized costs"

In addition,

(eg compensation).11

cost-

benefit and effectiveness analyses raise serious ethical
considerations.

It is claimed that assigning costs to

benefits and negative outcomes is a neutral aid to decision¬
making.

While cost-benefit can be a useful tool, providing

decision-makers with important information about the
consequences of various courses of action,

it becomes

dangerous when it becomes the decision rule itself.
forces the monetization of all considerations,
ethical ones.

MacLean and Sagoff,

This

including

in a report commissioned

for the excellent Office of Technology

(OTA)

report:

"Preventing Illness and Injury in the Workplace", make the
following point:
How can cost-benefit analysis claim to be either
neutral or comprehensive if it cannot deal with a
wide range of moral, cultural, aesthetic, and
political concerns?
There may be some issues that
raise few important cultural or moral issues? for
example, the commodities markets may be left to

'

.
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determine the prices of hog bellies or potash.
This does not show, however, that markets or
market analysis can give us an adequate policy for
public safety and health.
On the contrary, where
moral, political and cultural values-not simply
economic ones-are at stake, we need to make moral,
political, and aesthetic judgments.
Cost-benefit
analysis does not replace these "subjective"
judgments with "objective" or "neutral" ones.
Rather, it distorts or ignores the noneconomic
values it cannot handle.*2
Finally,

it must be pointed out that where large

differences in income,
institutions exist,
inevitable.

education,

and access to political

exploitation is more likely,

and perhaps

This is perhaps the clearest predisposing

factor...and also the most difficult to change,

as it is

sanctioned by beliefs at the core of American society.
These concerns might be dismissed as academic were it
not for the fact that there are almost certainly many more
Ureteks.

Most factory owners are not so deceitful,

nor do

they attract attention to themselves by polluting the
environment.

However,

this does not prevent workers from

getting sick, by accident or by negligence.

Most diseases

have longer latency periods than the liver injury from DMF,
making it difficult for worker or physician to correlate
illness and exposure.

As we have seen,

"flags" in the Uretek case,
was no simple matter.

even with these

the elucidation of the outbreak

The paradigms discussed in this

chapter are under attack and though the assault is not new
they will surely be slow to perish.

In the meantime there

will continue to be those who critique them and offer new
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ones to take their place.

We have to wonder if any will do

so more eloquently than Rabbi Steven Wise,

speaking at a

memorial service for the Triangle fire victims in 1911.
light of Uretek,

and many other workplace tragedies,

his

words are both prophetic and incisive:
This was not an inevitable disaster which man
could neither foresee nor control.
We might have
foreseen it, and some of us did; we might have
controlled it, but we chose not to do so.
The
things that are inevitable we can do no more than
vainly regret, but the things that are avoidable
we can effectively forestall and prevent.
It is not a question of enforcement of law
nor of inadequacy of law.
We have the wrong kind
of laws and the wrong kind of enforcement.
Before
insisting upon inspection and enforcement, let us
lift up the industrial standards so as to make
conditions worth inspecting, and, if inspected,
certain to afford security to the workers.
Instead if unanimity in the shirking of respon¬
sibility, we demand that departments shall
cooperate in planning ahead and working for the
future, with some measure of prevision and wisdom.
And when we go before the legislature of the
state, and demand increased appropriations in
order to ensure the possibility of a sufficient
number of inspectors, we will not forever be put
off with the answer: We have no money.
The lesson of the hour is that while property
is good, life is better, that while possessions
are valuable, life is priceless.
The meaning of
the hour is that the life of the lowliest worker
in the nation is sacred and inviolable, and, if
that sacred human right be violated, we shall
stand adjudged and condemned before the tribunal
of God and of history.13

In
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See Ashford (1976), 358-65 for an excellent discussion
of the principle of equity as it relates to workplace
health.
He details three principles: collective risk,
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10.
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11.
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